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I. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act*
A. FSIA CASES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the FSIA), a foreign state is presump-
tively immune from suit.' In Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, the Supreme Court of the
United States addressed the interaction between FSIA immunity and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19, which governs the joinder of required parties in any federal action.2
The case involved conflicting claims to assets that the former President of the Philip-
pines, Ferdinand Marcos, had improperly transferred from the government treasury to a
closely held Panamanian corporation. The funds were subsequently invested in a broker-
age account with Merrill Lynch in New York. Facing claims from various Marcos credi-
* Attorney-Adviser, Officer of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State. The views
expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of State or the United States
Government.
* Individual contributors will be referred to at the discussion of each relevant section.
* Contributed by Jonathan I. Blackman, Partner and Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Partner at Cleary Gottlieb
Steen & Hamilton LLP in New York, New York, with assistance from Vitali Rosenfeld, Rahul Mukhi, and
Ann Nee, all associates at the same firm. The authors' firm represented the Republic of Iraq in Agrocomplect
AD v. Republic oflraq, 524 F. Supp. 2d 16, 28 (D.D.C. 2007), affd, No. 07-7181 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 2008),
which is discussed infra Section I.C.2.
1. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1609 (1976). The presumption can only be
overcome if one of the exceptions enumerated in the FSIA applies. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349,
355 (1993).
2. See Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008).
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tors, Merrill Lynch filed an interpleader action in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Hawaii, where other related litigation was pending. The interpleaded defendants in-
cluded the Republic of the Philippines, a governmental commission (Commission) set up
by the Republic to recover funds wrongfully taken by Marcos, and a class of human rights
victims to whom the district court had awarded a two billion dollar judgment against
Marcos and his estate. (The Commission had brought separate litigation in the Philip-
pines to determine whether any property Marcos had obtained through the misuse of his
office was forfeited to the Republic under Philippine law.)
As a defense to the interpleader action, the Republic and the Commission asserted sov-
ereign immunity from suit under the FSIA. They further moved to dismiss the entire
action pursuant to Rule 19, arguing that the case could not proceed in their absence be-
cause it would unduly prejudice their legal interests in the property at issue. 3 In the
course of two interlocutory appeals, the Ninth Circuit held that although the Republic
and the Commission were necessary parties under Rule 19(a) and entitled to be dismissed
as parties based on sovereign immunity, the action could proceed without them because
their claim to the disputed assets was unlikely to succeed on the merits.4
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it violated principles of sovereign immunity
to address the likelihood of success on the merits of the foreign sovereign entities' claims
in their absence. 5 In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court stated that, where sover-
eign immunity is properly asserted "and the claims of the sovereign are not frivolous,
dismissal of the action must be ordered where there is potential for injury to the interests
of the absent sovereign." 6 The Court cited deference to the unique comity and dignity
interests of the Republic and the Commission "in determining if, and how, the assets
should be used to compensate those persons who suffered grievous injury under Marcos"
and the desirability of avoiding the "specific affront that could result to the Republic and
the Commission if the property they claim is seized by the decree of a foreign court."7
With respect to the related litigation pending in the Philippines, the Court noted that
"[t]here is a comity interest in allowing a foreign state to use its own courts for a dispute if
it has a right to do so."8 These comity principles precluded awarding the assets at issue to
3. Under Rule 19, a person must be joined as a required party to an action if, inter alia, "that person claims
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's
absence may... as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest." FED. R.
Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B). If such a required party cannot be joined, the court "must determine whether, in equity
and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed." FED. R.
Crv. P. 19(b).
4. See In re Republic of Philippines, 309 F.3d 1143, 1149-52 (9th Cir. 2002); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc. v. ENC Corp., 464 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2006).
5. See Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2189 ("The court's consideration of the merits was itself an infringement on
foreign sovereign immunity...").
6. Id. at 2191. The Court of Appeals had held that the Republic and the Commission's claims were likely
to fail because a misappropriation claim under New York law would be untimely under the six-year statute of
limitations. The Supreme Court found fault with that analysis because the Republic and the Commission had
other possible causes of action that would not be time-barred, including potential claims under Philippine
law. See id. The Court therefore concluded that the Republic's and the Commission's claims were non-
frivolous.
7. Id. at 2190.
8. Id.
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another party where the sovereign entities had an interest in the property and had prop-
erly asserted sovereign immunity.
B. AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF A FOREIGN STATE
1. "An Organ" of a Foreign State or Its Subdivision
The FSIA defines a "foreign state" to include an "agency or instrumentality" thereof,
i.e. "a separate legal person" that is either "an organ of" or majority owned by the state
itself or one of its political subdivisions. 9 In In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,
the Second Circuit held that the Saudi High Commission for Relief to Bosnia and Herze-
govina (SHC) was entitled to immunity as an "organ of a foreign state" under Section
1603(b)(2) of the FSIA.10 Applying the five-factor Filler test, the Court of Appeals rea-
soncd that "[t]he SHC was created for a national purpose (channeling humanitarian aid to
Bosnian Muslims); the Kingdom actively supervises it; many SHC workers are Kingdom
employees who remain on the Kingdom's payroll; the SHC holds the 'sole authority' to
collect and distribute charity to Bosnia; and it can be sued in administrative court in the
Kingdom."1 1
In California Department of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp., the Ninth Circuit likewise
found that Powerex, a Canadian power corporation, was an organ of British Columbia,
applying the principle that "an entity is an organ of a foreign state (or political subdivision
thereof) if it 'engages in a public activity on behalf of the foreign government. ' ' 12
Powerex's parent company, BC Hydro, created by British Columbia to promote hydroe-
lectric development, had been previously determined to be an organ of the province, be-
cause it performed "sovereign functions, not commercial ones." 13 In turn, Powerex, a
wholly owned subsidiary of BC Hydro, was created to market the export of power outside
the province, which the Ninth Circuit found to be a similarly sovereign purpose. 14 Ac-
cording to the Court of Appeals, Powerex's organ status was in no way rebutted by the fact
that British Columbia did not supervise Powerex directly, but rather through BC Hydro, 15
9. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), (b) (1976).
10. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2008).
11. Id. (quoting the test from Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004) ("(1) whether the
foreign state created the entity for a national purpose; (2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the
entity; (3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees and pays their salaries; (4)
whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the [foreign] country; and (5) how the entity is
treated under foreign state law.")).
12. Department of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087, 1098 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pa-
trickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 807 (9th Cir. 2001)). Cf, Filler, 378 F.3d at 220 (Korean Deposit
Insurance Corporation was an organ of a foreign state because it served a "public function").
13. Powerex, 533 F.3d at 1099 (quoting California v. NRG Energy Inc., 391 F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cit.
2004)).
14. As other indicia of the corporation's sovereign nature, the court noted its sole beneficial ownership by
the provincial government, its immunity from federal and provincial income tax, and its role in implementing
international agreements at the government's direction. See id. at 1101-02. That Powerex's employees were
not civil servants did not change the analysis. See id. at 1102.
15. See id. at 1101 ("There is no reason to think Congress cared for the manner in which foreign states
interacted with their organs-i.e., whether the foreign state supervises the organ directly, or through an incor-
porated agent."). In contrast, the distinction between direct and indirect subsidiaries of a foreign state be-
comes critical when the entity's claim to being categorized as an "insuumentality" under § 1603(b)(2) of the
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2. Individuals Acting in Official Government Capacities
This year, the Second Circuit considered whether an individual official of a foreign
state acting in his or her official capacity may qualify as an "agency or instrumentality" of
the state and accordingly be protected by FSIA immunity. 16 In answering that question in
the affirmative, the Second Circuit joined five other circuits. 17 The Court of Appeals held
that the four defendant Saudi princes must have acted in their official capacities in di-
recting and monitoring the channeling of funds to Islamic charities abroad; alternative
claims against them in their personal capacities failed for lack of personal jurisdiction.15
The D.C. Circuit reaffirmed the applicability of FSIA immunity to individual govern-
ment officials in Belhas v. a'alon.19 Absent any allegation in the complaint that the chal-
lenged actions of the defendant Israeli military officer were other than in his official
capacity, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the FSIA.20 The court
found no merit to plaintiff's argument that the FSIA should not apply to a foreign official
who had left office between the time of the commission of the challenged acts and the
commencement of the litigation.2 1
The D.C. District Court applied the same principles in Allen v. Russian Federation,
where Russian government officials were sued for their alleged "misstatements directed at
the United States and Global securities markets" concerning Yukos, a Russian oil com-
pany.22 Based on uncontested facts, the court found that the individuals made the state-
ments in their official capacities and were therefore entitled to FSIA immunity. 23
FSIA is based on the majority ownership by the foreign state rather than on its alleged "organ" status. See
Allen v. Russian Federation, 522 F. Supp. 2d 167, 185 (D.D.C. 2007) (declining to find that "an indirect
subsidiary of the Russian Federation" is its "instrumentality" under the FSIA) (citing Dole Food Co. v. Pa-
trickson, 538 U.S. 468, 474 (2003)).
16. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d at 80-81.
17. See id. at 81 (citing Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 399 (4th Cir. 2004); Keller v. Cent.
Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho
S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir.1999); Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020,
1027 (D.C. Cir.1997); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101-03 (9th Cir. 1990)). Only the
Seventh Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion, holding that "[i]f Congress meant to include individuals
acting in the official capacity in the scope of the FSIA, it would have done so in clear and unmistakable
terms." Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cit. 2005). As the Second Circuit noted, Congress
does make specific reference to "an official, employee or agent" of the foreign state in the newly enacted
§ 1605A of the FSIA. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d at 84 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605A(a)(1)).
18. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d at 93.
19. See Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
20. See id. at 1284. The court also confirmed that "the FSIA contains no unenumerated exception for
violations ofjus cogens norms." Id. at 1287 (citing authorities).
21. See id. at 1285-86 (distinguishing the Supreme Court's holding in Dole, 538 U.S. at 478, that a corpora-
tion's instrumentality status is defined at the time the suit is filed, on the ground that "the relationship
between the state and its officials" is governed by different rules). Cf Olympia Express, Inc. v. Linee Aeree
Italiane, S.P.A., 509 F.3d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 2007) (the Italian government's privatization of the defendant
airline after the suit was filed did not change its status under the FSIA or the jurisdictional basis of the action)
(citing Dole, 538 U.S. at 478).
22. Allen, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (citing Jungquist, 115 F.3d at 1027-28).
23. See id. at 190-91.
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C. EXCEPTIONS TO JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY
1. The Waiver Exception
The waiver exception to jurisdictional immunity under Section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA
provides that a foreign state is not immune from suit where it has "waived its immunity
either explicitly or by implication." In In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, the
Second Circuit reiterated the principle that the implied waiver provision should be con-
strued narrowly.2 4 That the SHC, an agency or instrumentality of Saudi Arabia created to
manage humanitarian aid to Bosnian Muslims, had identified itself as "nongovernmental"
on a registration document filed with Bosnian authorities was deemed insufficient to con-
stitute an implied waiver under section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA: "Registering as a humani-
tarian organization in Bosnia does not reflect a conscious decision by the SHC to waive its
sovereign immunity in Amcrican courts. '"2
In another case declining to find an implied waiver, Good v. Fuji Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
the Tenth Circuit held that the Japanese government did not waive immunity from suit in
the United States on behalf of its own ministries when it served them with process in
Tokyo pursuant to its international obligations as a signatory to the Hague Convention on
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters. 26
In Heroth v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the D.C. District Court concluded that, "[e]ven if
Saudi Arabia waived its sovereign immunity" in an inter-governmental agreement with the
United States, that waiver could not be invoked by employees of a U.S. corporate contrac-
tor performing work in Saudi Arabia, because "a contractual waiver of immunity does not
apply to third parties who are not privy to the contract," and there was no language in the
contract showing that the parties "intended to directly benefit the Plaintiffs as
individuals. 27
2. The Commercial Activity Exception
In In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, the Second Circuit held that donating to
charities-even with the intent that the funds be used for commercial purchases-was not
commercial activity under section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA.2S Applying the principle that
the character of an activity should be determined by its nature and not its purpose, the
Court of Appeals concluded that giving away money was not the type of action "by which
a private party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce,"' and thus was not in the nature
of commercial activity. 29
In Agrocomplect AD v. Republic of Iraq, the D.C. District Court held that, in a breach of
contract context, commercial activity must "directly affect the plaintiff' in order for a
claim arising from that activity to satisfy the "based upon" requirement of section
24. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d at 86.
25. Id.
26. See Good v. Fuji Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 271 Fed. Appx 756, 758 (10th Cir. 2008).
27. Heroth v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 565 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2008).
28. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d at 92.
29. Id. (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).
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1605(a)(2). 30 Likewise, where goods and services were not contractually mandated or ex-
pected to be supplied from the United States, but only allegedly chosen by plaintiff after
the contract was executed, there was no sufficient basis to show a "direct effect" in the
United States under section 1605(a)(2). 31
3. The Expropriation Exception
In Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation, the D.C. Circuit held
that the plaintiffs' claims to property rights in a Jewish religious archive allegedly expro-
priated by Russia were non-frivolous and could provide a basis for jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1605(a)(3) of the FSIA.32 By contrast, in Allen, the D.C. District Court found that
section 1605(a)(3) could not possibly apply to claims by investors of a bankrupt Russian oil
company: as shareholders, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any property right in the
allegedly expropriated corporate assets. 33
4. The Terrorism Exception
This year, Congress amended the FSLA by enacting a new section 1605A, which re-
placed the former section 1605(a)(7) and significantly transformed the scope and applica-
tion of the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity.34 Included as part of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), the most notable
changes brought about by the legislation are as follows:
0 Subsection 1605A(c) creates a new private right of action against a foreign state for
personal injury or death caused by acts of terrorism.3 5
30. Agrocomplect AD v. Republic of Iraq, 524 F. Supp. 2d 16, 28 (D.D.C. 2007), affd, No. 07-718, 2008
WL 5455695 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 2008). The authors' firm represented the Republic of Iraq in this action.
31. Id. at 32. See also Allen, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 189-90 (Russia's activities "within its own territory that
resulted in reduced funds flowing to the [equity] investors in a Russian company" could not be characterized
as a "direct effect" in the United States where there was no obligation to direct funds to individuals in the
United States). Multiple other district courts also applied the concept of "commercial activity" under
§ 1605(a)(2) in the recent year. See, e.g., Hilaturas Miel, S.L. v. Republic of Iraq, 573 F. Supp. 2d 781
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (sale of yam was commercial activity, even if under the auspices of the U.N. Oil for Food
Program); UNC Lear Services, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, No. SA-04-CA-1008-WRF, 2008 WL
2946059, at *11 (W'.D. Tex. July 25, 2008) (contracts by Saudi Arabia for the upgrade and maintenance of its
Air Force were commercial activity because, regardless of their purpose, the contracts for goods and services
exemplified "conduct typically engaged in by private parties"); Amorrortu v. Republic of Peru, 570 F. Supp.
2d 916, 923 (S.D. Tex. 2008) ("confiscation and expropriation are not commercial actions, for they are not
actions of a nature that a private person would, or could, engage in for profit"); Allen, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 188
(actions by a foreign state in connection with an alleged expropriation were not commercial activity, even ifa
subsequent disposition of the assets benefited some commercial entities at the expense of others).
32. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation, 528 F.3d 934, 942-49 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
33. See Allen, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 185-87.
34. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083,
122 Stat. 3, 338-344 (2008); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A.
35. The former § 1605(a)(7) was strictly jurisdictional in nature and required plaintiffs to look elsewhere
for a cause of action, whereas the Flatow Amendment, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (2000) (published
as a note to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605), provided for a cause of action only against agents, officials or employees of a
foreign state but not against the foreign state itself. See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 65
(D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2008) (citing Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1027 (D.C. Cir.
2004)). In Gates, the D.C. District Court also held that, as a result of the new federal cause of action created
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" The same subsection explicitly provides that money damages in such an action may
include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and-for the first time
under the FSLA-punitive damages. 36
" Where an action under section 1605A(c) has been brought, section 1605A(d) creates
a further right of action for reasonably foreseeable property loss, third party liabil-
ity, and loss claims under life and property insurance policies arising from the same
acts. 3
7
" Subsection 1605A(g) provides for an extremely broad and almost automatic prejudg-
ment attachment of any real or tangible personal property located in the district,
titled in the name of any defendant or "any entity controlled by any defendant," and
amenable to attachment under section 1610.31
* The new section expands the jurisdictional scope of the terrorism exception by in-
cluding cases where the claimant or the victim was a member of the armed forces, or
was a U.S. government employee of individual contractor acting within the scope of
employment. 39
" Appeals in actions brought under section § 1605A are limited to those from orders
"conclusively ending the litigation" or those certified for appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b).40
* Where a foreign state becomes undesignated as a state sponsor of terrorism, sover-
eign immunity is reinstated six months thereafter, i.e. any new claims under the
terrorism exception must be filed within that period to be jurisdictionally viable.41
Implementation of the new section 1605A has given rise to some transitional issues.
The D.C. Circuit, for example, confirmed that following the enactment of section 1605A
courts retain jurisdiction over cases previously filed under section 1605(a)(7). 42 On the
other hand, the NDAA also provides that any action commenced under the former section
1605(a)(7), which had been adversely affected by the failure of that provision to create a
cause of action against the foreign state would, upon motion by plaintiffs within sixty days
of the enactment of section 1605A, be treated as if it had been brought under the new
by § 1605A(c), plaintiffs can no longer rely on substantive state law for additional causes of action against
foreign states for engaging in state-sponsored terrorism.
36. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(c); cf 28 U.S.C.A § 1606, generally barring imposition of punitive damages
against a foreign state. The D.C. District Court has already applied § 1605A(c) in entering a default judg-
ment against Syria for almost $113 million, plus $300 million in punitive damages, for providing material
support to a terrorist group that captured and beheaded two civilian U.S. contractors in Iraq. Gates, 580 F.
Supp. 2d, at 69-75.
37. La Reunion Aerienne v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahiriya, 533 F.3d 837, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
held that an assignee or subrogee insurance company could bring claims under the former § 1605(a)(7) to the
same extent as its policy holder victims. The new § 1605A(d) appears to codify this right.
38. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(g).
39. See 28 U.S.CA §§ 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I1)-(Im). Section 1605A continues to provide subject matter ju-
risdiction over cases where the claimant or victim is a U.S. national. See § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(1); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(7)(B)(2) (repealed 2007).
40. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(f). This provision appears to preclude interlocutory appeals under the collateral
order doctrine and under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a), including those involving injunctions and receiver-
ships-which could be especially critical in conjunction with the draconian prejudgment attachments author-
ized by § 1605A(g).
41. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
42. See Simon v. Republic oflraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1192-94 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing NDAA §§ 1083(c)-
(d)).
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provision, as long as the case was still "before the courts in any form," including on appeal
or on motion for relief from a final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).43 Actions
related to an earlier action properly filed under section 1605(a)(7) may also be brought
under section 1605A if filed within sixty days of the later of the enactment of section
1605A or the entry of judgment in the original action.44
Only a few cases under the new section 1605A have so far reached appellate courts.
Most significantly, in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, the Second Circuit
considered whether an action against the Kingdom and several agents of Saudi Arabia,
which had not been designated a state sponsor of terrorism so as to permit suit under
section 1605A, could instead be brought under the non-commercial tort exception to im-
munity of section 1605(a)(5).45 The Court of Appeals answered in the negative, conclud-
ing that it would be impermissible to allow plaintiffs to "shoehorn a claim properly
brought under one exception into another" in order to "evade and frustrate" the express
safeguards that Congress put in place to limit claims against foreign states arising from
terrorist acts only to the designated state sponsors of terrorism.4 6
In two cases this year, the D.C. Circuit addressed facial challenges to the terrorism
exception. 47 In Owens v. Republic of Sudan, the Court of Appeals held that the requirement
for a determination by the U.S. Secretary of State whether a state was a designated state
sponsor of terrorism as a predicate for jurisdiction under the terrorism exception was not
an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its power to define the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts.48 In Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, the Court of Appeals held that the
possibility for some states to be designated as state sponsors of terrorism, and thus to be
subjected to greater liability in U.S. courts, did not expressly conflict with the principle of
sovereign equality enunciated in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter; accordingly,
application of the terrorism exception was not precluded by the clause of section 1604 of
the FSIA that makes the statute subject to "existing international agreements." 49
43. Nat'l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 § 1083(c)(2)(C), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A. Notably, the
D.C. District Court has held that, once a final judgment has been entered, the case is no longer "before the
courts in any form," even if plaintiffs are still seeking to execute on the judgment. See, e.g., Holland v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 545 F. Supp. 2d 120, 121-22 (D.D.C. 2008).
44. See Nat'l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 § 1083(c)(3), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A.
45. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d at 71 (2d Cir. 2008).
46. Id. at 89. Notably, the D.C. District Court held to the contrary in Doe v. Bin Laden, 580 F. Supp. 2d
93 (D.D.C. 2008), concluding that claims against Afghanistan for terrorism-related acts could be brought
under the non-commercial tort exception. The court reasoned that barring U.S. citizens from bringing any
such tort claims against foreign states, other than in the small number of cases involving designated state
sponsors of terrorism, would be a "peculiar result" that should counsel against such a construction of the
FSIA. Id. at 97.
47. While both cases specifically addressed the former § 1605(a)(7), the substance of the challenge and the
Court of Appeals' reasoning should be equally applicable to § 1605A.
48. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 531 F.3d 884, 892 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
49. Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 266 Fed. Appx. 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1604).
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II. Service of Process Abroad*
A. INTERNATIONAL SERVICE VIA REGISTERED MAIL
The service of process upon an individual in a foreign country in civil actions brought
in federal courts is governed by Rule 4() of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
Volkswagenwerk Akteingesellschaft v. Schlunk, the Supreme Court held that when service of
process is to be made in a foreign country that is a signatory to the Hague Convention on
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (Hague Convention), Rule
4() requires that the Hague Convention's provisions are the exclusive means to effectuate
process.50 In applying the provisions of the Hague Convention through Rule 4(f), one
issue of recurrent debate is whether the Convention allows for the service of process via
international registered mail.
Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention states that as long as the foreign state "does not
object, the present Convention shall not interfere with . .. the freedom to send judicial
documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad." U.S. courts have long strug-
gled with whether this language, particularly the (undefined) terms "send" and "judicial
documents," allows for service of process via international registered mail. In 2008, the
issue was once again the subject of litigation.
In Zelasko v. Comerio, the defendant, an Italian business, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that service by mail of untranslated documents was improper.S1 The district
court rejected the motion, noting that the Seventh Circuit has held that service by certi-
fied mail is permitted by Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention and that the plain lan-
guage of Article 10(a) permits service by mail.52 To address the issue of whether or not the
receiving State, Italy, a signatory to the Hague Convention, objects to the service of pro-
cess by mail, the court relied upon the State Department's website, which has a webpage
dedicated to Hague Convention.5 3
With respect to whether the Hague Convention required that the documents be trans-
lated into Italian, the district court noted that Article 5 of the Convention states that the
foreign country may require documents to be translated if the documents are served
through the central authority.54 Thus, the court concluded, the Hague Convention itself
does not mandate translation as a general matter. Moreover, because in this case the
plaintiff did not use the central authority to begin with, there could be no translation
requirement. Notably, the court did not delve into the issue of whether Italy's central
authority requires translation for documents served through its offices. Instead, the court
merely observed that the defendant did not argue that it did not understand the docu-
ments or that it had not otherwise received adequate notice. 55
* Contributed by William Lawrence, partner at Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP in New York, New
York. Special thanks to Rami Bardenstein, an associate with Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP, for his
research assistance.
50. See Volkswagenwerk Akteingesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
51. See Zelasko v. Comerio, No. 08-366-MJR, 2008 U.S Dist. LEXIS 53316, *1 (S.D. Il1. July 14, 2008).
52. See id. at *4-5.
53. See id. at *4. The State Department website address referenced by the court is http://travel.state.gov/
law/info/judicial/judicial_686.htnl.
54. See id. at *5.
55. See id.
SUMMER 2009
514 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
In Wong v. Partygaming Ltd., the Northern District for the District of Ohio similarly
held that a complaint sent via registered international mail to Gibraltar was proper.5 6 In
analyzing the issue, the court first noted that the United Kingdom was a signatory to the
Hague Convention and thus by extension so was Gibraltar and, second, that while the
United Kingdom has objected to Articles 10(b) and 10(c), it has not objected to Article
10(a).5 7 Although the defendant argued that no court in the Sixth Circuit had found that
an initial complaint mailed to Gibraltar complied with the Hague Convention, the court
was not persuaded that to do so was improper, especially considering that the defendants
were not prejudiced.58 The court tacitly accepted that the terms "send" and "judicial doc-
uments" in Article 10(a) encompassed the mailing of an initial complaint.
In United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Nabtesco Corp., the plaintiff requested the
court's authorization to serve process on a Japanese defendant by international certified
mail, fax, e-mail, or Federal Express. 59 Citing a 2004 Ninth Circuit case and "persuasive
authority cited in plaintiff's motion," the court authorized the use of international certi-
fied mail.60 With respect to the alternative methods of service requested by the plaintiff,
the court noted that while the authorization of alternate means was within the court's
discretion under Rule 4, the plaintiffs stated reasons for the request-"it 'will be much
faster, thus moving this case forward in an expeditious and cost-effective manner' "-were
insufficient, particularly as the plaintiff had offered no evidence to suggest that service by
mail would be ineffective. 61
Finally, in LG Philips LCD Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp. the District Court
for the District of Delaware was presented with the question of whether service of a sum-
mons and complaint by international registered mail on a Taiwanese defendant complied
with Rule 4(0(2).62 Because Taiwan is not a signatory to the Hague Convention, the court
was obligated to look to Rule 4 for guidance. Rule 4(0(2) allows for overseas service in
any manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country. The court noted that according
to the State Department's website, Taiwan allows for service or proves to be effected by
international mail/return receipt. 63 Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
service of process was valid.
64
C. OTHER ISSUES ARiSING UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The issue of untranslated documents was before the court in Albo v. Suzuki Motor
Corp.65 There, the plaintiff, the widow of a motorcycle crash victim, attempted to serve
56. See Wong v. Partygaming Ltd., No. 06-CV-2376, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37039, at *7 (N.D. Ohio May
6, 2008).
57. See id, at *6.
58. See id. at *10-*11.
59. See U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Nabtesco Corp., No. C07-1221RSL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79278, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2007).
60. Id. at *3 (citing Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 2004)).
61. See id. at *5.
62. See LG. Philips LCD Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics, Corp., 551 F. Supp. 2d 333, 341 (D. Del.
2008).
63. See id. at 342.
64. See id.
65. Albo v. Suzuki Motor Corp. No. 08-cv-01 39, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62913, at *5-8 (W.D. Tex. July 2,
2008).
VOL. 43, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 515
process on the Japanese defendant by registered mail directly to Japan. The defendant, a
motorcycle company, alleged a failure to comply with the Hague Convention because the
documents were in English, not translated into Japanese, and not sent through the Japa-
nese central authority.
Although the plaintiff admitted improper service (and, remarkably, had done so in past,
unrelated cases), the court still granted the plaintiff leave of sixteen weeks to translate the
complaint and effect service.66 The Court noted that the defendant did not state any facts
showing that it was prejudiced by the improper service, and that the favored remedy for
non-compliance with the Hague Convention is an appropriate time to serve properly.67
This focus on actual notice and whether or not the defendant is prejudiced is similar to the
approach taken by the court in Zelasko.
Interesting issues concerning the actions of the foreign country's central authority arose
in a number of cases. In Unite National Retirement Fund v. Ariela, Inc., the district court
addressed a situation in which the central authority of Mexico verified service of process
yet the defendant argued that service was insufficient because the service did not comply
with Mexican law and because the certificate returned by the central authority was not the
model form.68 The defendant asserted that a court clerk in Mexico charged with serving
process merely affixed the documents to a wire door after being unable to get the defen-
dant to exit his house.
In addressing the defendant's arguments, the court noted that it is prima facie evidence
that service was made in compliance with the Hague Convention when a central authority
has certified service. 69 Accordingly, the court would not delve into the issue of what Mex-
ican law requires of the Mexican central authority. Further, the court noted that the form
of the certification from the central authority was not critical. What was relevant to the
court was the fact that the defendant received actual notice.70 The defendant did not
contend that he did not have actual notice, but instead argued a technicality that was non-
prejudicial. In relying on actual notice, the court observed that "[s]ervice of process is not
intended to be a game of cat and mouse."7
Further highlighting that actual notice is the cornerstone of any service of process issue,
is Coombs v. Iorio.72 In Coombs, the issue was whether the lack of an original certificate of
service as required by the Hague Convention from the Kuwaiti Ministry of Justice was
fatal to the plaintiff's case. Finding that the record reflected that the defendant's were
actually served, and thus had actual notice, and that the plaintiff had made a good faith
effort to obtain the certificate, the court concluded that service of process was properly
effected. 73 As in the Albo, Zelasko, and Ariela cases discussed above, the primary focus was
on actual notice.
66. See id. at *10.
67. See id. at *9.
68. See Unite Nat'l Retirement Fund v. Ariela, Inc., No. 06-cv-0055, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66717
(S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2008).
69. See id. at *15.
70. See id. at *18.
71. Id. at 20.
72. Coombs v. Iono No. 06-060-SPS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66251 (E.D. Olka. Aug. 28, 2008).
73. See id. at *7.
SUMMER 2009
516 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
In U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Lake Shore Asset Management Ltd., the
plaintiff, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), served various entities of
Lake Shore Asset Management located in England, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks &
Caicos Islands, and the Isle of Man.7 4 CFTC served the defendants by using persons
authorized under the law of each jurisdiction to serve judicial documents.
In determining that CFTC's service of process was valid, the court employed a two-step
analysis. First, noting that the United Kingdom is a signatory to the Hague Convention,
the court concluded that the Hague Convention extends throughout the United King-
dom, including the British Virgin Islands, the Isle of Mann, and the Turks & Caicos Is-
lands. 75 Next, the court looked to Articles 10(c) and 19 of the Hague Convention.76
Article 10(c) allows direct service through judicial officers or competent persons if the
receiving country does not object. Article 19 states that any method of service is effective
if allowed by the contracting state. Relying on an affidavit from a solicitor of the Supreme
Court of England and Wales summarizing the laws governing service of process in each
jurisdiction that supported service of process through authorized persons, the court held
that CFTC's service of process was proper under Articles 10(c) and 19.77
III. Personal Jurisdiction*
Federal personal jurisdiction jurisprudence experienced little to no change in 2008, with
few published cases even addressing the topic with any substance. The most interesting
developments were in the area of so-called libel tourism and its impact on the enforce-
ment of foreign judgments; the remaining cases are illustrative of the current state of the
law as to due process minimum contacts and the capacity to waive jurisdiction in forum
selection clauses.
A. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
In Ebrenfeki v. Mahfouz, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction of an American author's attempt to enjoin enforcement of a foreign judg-
ment.78 In its decision, the Second Circuit relied on the New York Court of Appeals'
interpretation that New York's long-arm statute does not apply when a person's contacts
with the forum are only based on seeking enforcement of a foreign judgment. 79 In re-
sponse to the New York Court of Appeals' decision, the New York legislature amended its
long-arm statute to apply to "any person who obtains a judgment in a defamation pro-
74. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Lake Shore Asset Mgmt. Ltd., No. 07-C-3598, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33773, *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2008).
75. See id. at *14-15.
76. See id. at *15.
77. See id. at *17.
* Jarrett B. Perlow, Staff Attorney, United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The views
expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the court or the United States Government.
78. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 489 F.3d 542 (2d. Cir. 2007) (certifying questions to Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz,
881 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 2007); Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008) (aff'g original dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction). See generally International Litigation: Personal Jurisdiction, 42 INT'L LAW 415,
431-32 (2008).
79. Id. at 104-05.
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ceeding outside the United States against any person who is a resident of New York [and
other categories of relation to New York].,,80 But the new law extends jurisdiction "only
for the purposes of rendering declaratory relief with respect to that person's liability for
the judgment, and/or for the purpose of determining whether said judgment should be
deemed non-recognizable" under New York law. 81 In Congress, two related, pending bills
would create a federal cause of action to recover from a foreign judgment for defamation
based on "any writing, utterance, or other speech by that person that has been published,
uttered, or otherwise disseminated in the United States." 82 In both proposals personal
jurisdiction would stem from a foreigner filing suit against a "United States person" or
against someone with assets in the United States that could be used to enforce the foreign
judgment.83 Should either bill become federal law, we will likely see a constitutional due
process challenge to the personal jurisdiction provision if and when the first action is filed
in federal court.
B. SUFFICIENr MNIMIUM CONTACTS
Although it did not break new legal ground, the Tenth Circuit's opinion in AST Sports
Science, Inc., v. CLF Distribution Ltd, provides a concise summary of the current state of
federal personal jurisdiction law, as well as an illustration of how one state's long-arm
statute applies in a tort and contract dispute.84 AST, a Colorado corporation, entered into
an agreement with CLF, an English corporation, where CLF would be the sole distribu-
tor of AST's products in Europe.85 After CLF did not pay AST, AST sued in diversity for
breach of contract and for fraud in the inducement.86 The district court granted CLF's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the court lacked spe-
cific jurisdiction over CLF for these claims.8 7 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed,
finding that CLF was subject to the specific jurisdiction of the district court.88 While a
contract alone would not support the minimum contacts requirement, the court found
that CLF had created "continuing obligations" and "substantial connection" through (1)
CLF's approaching AST in Colorado about forming a business relationship, (2) the per-
petuation of an ongoing business relationship with AST in Colorado to further the con-
tract,89 and (3) the ongoing, seven-year physical presence of CLF's president in
80. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(d) (McKinney 2008) (effective Apr. 28, 2008); see also Vincent C. Alexander, Sup-
PLEMENTARY PRACTICE COMMIEN-TARIES, C302:17, "Libel Terrorism Protection Act" (2008) (explaining that
the new provision intended to overrule the New York state Ehrenfeld decision) (electronic supplement availa-
ble through Westlaw's McKinney database).
81. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(d) (McKinney 2008).
82. The Free Speech Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 5814, 110th Cong. § 3; The Free Speech Protection Act
of 2008, S. 2977, 110th Cong. § 3; see also Sen. Arlen Specter & Sen. Joe Lieberman, Foreign Courts Take Aim
at Our Free Speech, WALL. ST. J., July 14, 2008, at A15, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB121599561708449643.html?mod=Googlenewswsj (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (discussing the issue of libel
tourism and their proposed legislation).
83. H.R. 5814, 110th Cong. § 3 (2008); S. 2977, 110th Cong. § 3 (2008).
84. See AST Sports Sci., Inc., v. CLF Distribution Ltd, 514 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2008).
85. See id. at 1055-56.
86. See id. at 1055.
87. See id. at 1058.
88. See id. at 1058, 1061.
89. The court noted that the advent of modem communications provides a substitute for the longstanding
physical presence requirement in the forum jurisdiction, as these communications, such as those in this case,
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Colorado. 90 On the tort claim, the court noted that Colorado courts base tort jurisdiction
on whether the tortious injury, not act, occurred in Colorado; under that principle, the
tortious injury occurred in Colorado as AST suffered exclusively in Colorado from CLF's
non-payment.9 1 Because CLF had sufficient minimum contacts with Colorado, the court
then considered whether it was still reasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction over CLF.
The court concluded that jurisdiction was reasonable, in part, because of (1) the defen-
dant's familiarity with Colorado, (2) Colorado law would govern the contract, (3) the case
had no legal connection to England, and (4) the litigation was complicated by AST's
pending bankruptcy proceeding in Colorado.92
On the other hand, courts are still reluctant to find personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants when they are not directly connected to the forum or alleged cause of action.
In a tort action in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the families of
the deceased victims and the victims of the attacks sued several foreign parties, including
Saudi Arabia and four Saudi princes, on a theory that these parties provided financial and
logistical support to the perpetrators of the attacks.9 3 The Second Circuit affirmed dis-
missal for lack of personal jurisdiction, rejecting the argument that indirect support of "a
terrorist attack on a citizen of the United States constitutes purposeful direction at this
forum 'such that [they] should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court' here."94 In
reaching its conclusion, the court surveyed five earlier terrorist attack cases where courts
exercised personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants who were "primary participants in
terrorist acts." 95 The court reasoned that, unlike in these earlier cases, the defendants'
donation of money to charities that later used the donations to fund and to support terror-
ism was too tenuous to find any "intentional conduct" directed at the United States.
96
Similarly, "the provision of financial services to an entity that carries out a terrorist attack"
would not form a basis for personal jurisdiction unless the "managers of those financial
institutions 'purposefully directed' their 'activities at residents of [this] forum. ' ' 9 7 Because
the plaintiffs could not show that the defendants directed their financial contributions
"provide additional evidence" of a continuous business relationship. Id. at 1059 (quoting Pro Axess v. Orlux
Distrib., Inc., 428 F.3d 1270, 1278 (10th Cir. 2005)).
90. See id. at 1058-60 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). As the court
stated bluntly, "lilt should not be a surprise to defendants that this continuing relationship and the resulting
obligations to plaintiff subjects them to regulations and sanctions in Colorado for the consequences of their
alleged activities." Id. at 1059-60 (citation omitted).
91. See id. at 1060-61 (explaining that the district court misapplied Colorado case law).
92. See id. at 1061-63.
93. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d at 71 (2d Cir. 2008).
94. Id. at 93 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474). The court also affirmed dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. See id. at 80-93.
95. Id. at 94 (discussing Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (jurisdiction over al Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania); Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323
(D. Utah 2006) (jurisdiction over al Qaeda member for attack on soldiers in Afghanistan); Pugh v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 290 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2003) (jurisdiction over Libyan government
for commercial aircraft bombing); Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (same); Daliberti v. Rep. of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000) (jurisdiction over Iraq for
state-sponsored terrorism).
96. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d at 95 ("IT]he plaintiffs must establish that [de-
fendants] 'expressly aimed' intentional tortious acts at residents of the United States") (quoting Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984)).
97. Id. at 96 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472) (edit in original).
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with the intent of committing the attacks, the district court properly dismissed the claims
for lack of personal jurisdiction.9"
C. WAIVER OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Finally, in a patent infringement suit by Bradford, a Michigan corporation, against con-
Teyor Multibag (conTeyor), a Belgium corporation, and its North American subsidiary,
conTeyor North America, Inc. (conTeyor N.A.), 99 conTeyor moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. In granting the motion, the district court rejected Bradford's allega-
tion that conTeyor previously consented to personal jurisdiction in Ohio through forum
selection clauses in conTeyor's license agreement with Bradford and distributorship agree-
ment with a non-party. 1°° The court noted that while forum selection clauses can waive
personal JusdiLctiun objections, the extends only to disputes under the contract
and is not of general applicability to all potential suits.10 1 The court went on to reject
Bradford's five additional theories of personal jurisdiction over conTeyer based upon the
acts of conTeyer N.A.,10 E finding that he failed to present "sufficient evidence to make a
prima facie showing" in support of personal jurisdiction over conTeyor. 10 3
IV. The Act of State Doctrine*
A. INTRODUCTION
The act of state doctrine is a prudential limitation on the exercise of judicial review' 0 4
and reflects judicial reluctance to interfere in matters of foreign relations more appropri-
ately left to the other branches of government. 105 Applying the doctrine, U.S. courts will
avoid reviewing cases or controversies that require passing judgment on the validity of the
official acts of a foreign State performed in its own territory.106
98. See id. at 95, 96.
99. See Bradford Co. v. Afco Mfg., Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 612 (S.D. Ohio 2008). Additional defendants were
corporations in Michigan and Ohio but had already reached settlements with Bradford. Id. at 617.
100. See id. at 621.
101. See id. at 621-22 ("Plaintiff has presented no authority or arguments to ameliorate the Court's previ-
ously expressed concern that such a far-reaching interpretation of a forum selection clause infringes upon a
party's due process rights.").
102. Bradford's five theories of personal jurisdiction included (1) agency, (2) attribution, (3) merger, (4) alter
ego, and (5) joint venture. See id. at 617.
103. See id. at 635.
* Contributed by Matthew D. Slater, Partner and Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Partner at Cleary Gottlieb
Steen & Hamilton LLP in Washington, D.C. and New York, New York, with assistance from Lee F. Berger,
and Kish Vinayagamoorthy, both associates at the same firm.
104. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Credit Suisse v. U. S. Dist. Court,
130 F.3d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1997).
105. See Siderman de Blake v. Rep. of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1992).
106. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 ; Credit Suisse, 130 F.3d 1342.
SUMMER 2009
520 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
B. COLLABORATION WITH A FOREIGN STATE DOES NOT SHIELD A U.S. FEDERAL
DEPARTMENT FROM SCRUTINY
In Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, the district court for the Northern District of California
explained that when a foreign State acts in collaboration with a U.S. federal department,
the act of state doctrine does not prevent a court from assessing whether the federal de-
partment acted in compliance with U.S. law.' 07 Okinawa Dugong involved a challenge to
steps taken by Japan and the United States to relocate the United States Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma, Japan to a site off the coast of Okinawa, Japan. Plaintiffs alleged that in
proposing the new location, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) failed to consider the
effect of the relocation on the dugong, an endangered marine mammal, in violation of the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).10
The district court held that it had jurisdiction to review DoD's compliance with the
NHPA, stating that the additional involvement of a foreign State in the matter did "not by
itself implicate the act of state doctrine." 10 9 While the various activities involved were
divided between foreign and U.S. entities, the court analyzed the nature of each activity
that it would review in order to decide whether it would risk declaring "invalid the official
act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory."" 0
C. REGIME CHANGE ALONE IS LNSUFFICIENT TO SET ASIDE THE DOCTRINE
In Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation, the D.C. Circuit ana-
lyzed the applicability of the act of state doctrine where the government that took the
challenged actions no longer exists."' Previously, the Supreme Court in Sabbatino had
included the lack of continuing existence of a foreign government as a factor potentially
warranting the non-application of the act of state doctrine."12 Chabad involved claims by a
Jewish religious organization against the Russian Federation for the return of books, man-
uscripts and documents of faith that Russia's government seized during two periods: the
years following the October Revolution (1917-1925) and following the end of World War
fi.
113
107. See Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F.Supp. 2d 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
108. Congress amended the NHPA in 1980 to include a provision that governed United States undertakings
abroad and required the lead federal agency undertaking the matter to evaluate the effects of such an under-
taking on protected properties under the World Heritage List or foreign equivalents of the National Register.
16 U.S.C. § 470f (1966). The dugong is a protected "natural monument" listed on the Japanese Register of
Cultural Properties. See Okinawa Dugong, 543 F.Supp. 2d at 1084. In a previous ruling in 2005, the district
court for the Northern District of California had determined that the act of state doctrine does not cover the
planning processes between DoD and the Government of Japan because that planning process was not an
official act by a foreign sovereign on foreign soil. See Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3123,'67 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
109. Okinawa Dugong, 543 F.Supp. 2d at 1099.
110. Id. The Court was also persuaded by the fact that Japan had initially preferred a site that avoided the
habitat of the dugong and that it was DoD that had insisted on the coastal water site for operational reasons.
Id. at 1098.
111. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U. S. v. Russian Fed'n, 528 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
112. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
113. See Agudas Cbasidei Chabad of U.S., 528 F.3d at 938-40.
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In connection with the 1917-1925 seizures, the court agreed with the Russian Federa-
tion's argument that the act of state doctrine was still applicable-even though the Soviet
government that had taken the act at issue was no longer in power-because the current
government stood by the decision. 14 In refusing to relax the act of state doctrine, the
court recognized that Sabbatino's invitation for flexibility in applying the doctrine was "at
its apex where the taking government has been succeeded by a radically different re-
gime." ' 5 Though the D.C. Circuit noted that other courts had set aside the act of state
doctrine based on a regime change, it distinguished those cases on the ground that in each
of them the State was not a defendant; instead, the defendant was a private corporation or
an ousted ruler. 1 6 In Chabad, on the other hand, the Russian Federation was the defen-
dant and stood by the action of the former regime, thereby implicating many of the poli-
cies underlying the act of state doctrine." 7 Furthermore, relying on the change of regime
alone imperiled U.S. foreign policy sufficiently to require applicability of the act of state
doctrine:
[W]hile no one doubts that the collapse of the Soviet Union has entailed radical
political and economic changes in the territory of what is now the Russian Federa-
tion, application of Sabbatino's invitation to flexibility would here embroil the court in
a seemingly rather political evaluation of the character of the regime change itself-
in comparison, for example, to de-Nazification and other aspects of Germany's post-
war history. It is hard to imagine that we are qualified to make such judgments.
Moreover, our plunging into the process would seem likely, at least in the absence of
an authoritative lead from the political branches, to entail just the implications for
foreign affairs that the doctrine is designed to avert. 118
The plaintiff also argued that the act of state doctrine should not apply because the
seizures were undertaken in order to suppress the practice of Judaism, and so violated
well-settledjus cogens norms analogous to those prohibiting racial discrimination. 19 The
Court stated that it was reluctant to evaluate "violations of international law on a spec-
trum, dispensing with the act of state doctrine for the vilest," and was also unclear on what
would need to be established in order to satisfy "consensus" under Sabbatino.'20 The court
deferred judgment on plaintiff'sjus cogens theory and remanded the issue for further devel-
opment of this issue.' 21
D. THE TERRITORIAL LIMrATION TO THE DOCTRINE
The second seizure of books in Agudas Casidei Chabad alleged to have occurred at the
end of World War II raised the question of the territorial application of the act of state
114. See id. at 954.
115. Id. at 953.
116. See id. at 954.
117. See id.
118. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S., 528 F.3d at 954.
119. See id. (stating the proposition that "the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a
particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding
it" (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964))).
120. Id. at 955.
121. See id.
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doctrine. As the D.C. Circuit explained: "[tjhe act of state doctrine applies only when a
seizure occurs within the expropriator's sovereign territory[,]" as the act of state doctrine
only applies when the foreign State's act occurs within its sovereign territory.122 The
court explained that because the seizure at the end of World War II most likely occurred
in post-war Poland, and not Russia, the Russian Federation could not rely upon the doc-
trine because it had not met the territorial element for establishing its claim to the invoca-
tion of the act of state doctrine.123
In Universal Trading & Investment Co. v. Kiritchenko, the District Court for the Northern
District of California similarly confirmed the inapplicability of the act of state doctrine to
"judicial review of the extraterritorial effects of acts of state."'1 24 In Universal Trading, the
plaintiff-who sued on behalf of the Government of Ukraine-claimed that the Govern-
ment of Ukraine had assigned to it the right of recovery of damages and assets for theft
claims against the defendant, Kiritchenko. 125 The defendant challenged the assignment.
The court agreed with the defendant that the mere fact that the Prosecutor Generals of
Ukraine had made the assignment did not insulate its legality from judicial review under
the act of state doctrine, given that the assignment was made to a U.S. company for the
intended purpose of litigation in the United States. 126 For the doctrine to apply, the en-
tirety of the action must have occurred in the foreign territory. Since the assignment
purportedly was made in order to allow for litigation in the United States to recover assets
in the United States, the court found that "the act in question was not committed entirely
within Ukraine." 127
E. THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE
In A.A.Z.A. v. Doe Run Resources Corp., the district court for the Eastern District of
Missouri held that Sabbatino did not create an exception to the well-pleaded complaint
rule. 128 In A.A.Z.A., 137 citizens of Peru filed an action claiming that they had been
exposed to lead and other substances that had been released by an entity owned by U.S.
companies that at one time was state-owned. 129
The defendants removed the action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446. In oppos-
ing the plaintiffs' motion to remand, the defendants argued that removal was warranted on
the ground that their defense raised federal question subject-matter jurisdiction under the
federal common law of foreign relations "because the lawsuit implicates the vital economic
and sovereign interests of Peru."1 30 Agreeing with the Ninth Circuit holding in Patrickson
v. Dole Food Co.13 1 that "Sabbatino did not create an exception to the well-pleaded com-
122. Id. at 952.
123. See id.
124. Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Kiritchenko, No. C-99-3073 MMC, 2007 WL 2669841 at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Sep. 7, 2007).
125. See id. at *1.
126. See id. at *8.
127. Id.
128. A.A.Z.A. v. Doe Run Res. Corp., No. 07CV1874, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21298 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
129. Id. at *3.
130. Id. at *7.
131. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co. 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001).
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plaint rule," the court looked to the complaint. 32 Since the complaint alleged state law
claims and did not seek to impose liability on the government of Peru (or for that matter
allege misconduct by the government), the court concluded that the complaint did not
include any matters that constituted an act of state or otherwise implicated international
legal principles. 33 Consequently, the court remanded the case to state court. 34
F. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
In Nocula v. UGS Corp., the Seventh Circuit held that the act of state doctrine applied to
bar a lawsuit seeking to reclaim property and associated losses in connection with the
Polish police's seizure of property as part of the enforcement of Polish criminal laws. 135
The court explained that it could not rule on the validity of the seizure without calling
into question the enforcement actions of the police.' 36
In United States v. Lazarenko, the court allowed a forfeiture proceeding to go forward in
connection with funds allegedly laundered by former Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavel
Lazarenko through an Antinguan bank account later frozen by the Antiguan authori-
ties. 137 The court held that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable because the re-
quested forfeiture would not invalidate or contravene any order of the Antiguan court.'38
In Reyes-Vasquez v. United States Attorney General, the petitioner challenged his extradi-
tion to the United States, claiming that he was not extradited pursuant to the laws of the
Dominican Republic. 139 The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
found that "determining whether the President of the Dominican Republic may lawfully
authorize an extradition despite the prohibition of the extradition under Dominican law is
a question for the courts of the Dominican Republic.' 40 The court found that peti-
tioner's claim invited the court to pass judgment on the legality of the President's acts that
were committed within the Dominican Republic. The court held that the petitioner
lacked standing because under the act of state doctrine the court was powerless to declare
that the actions of the Dominican Republic were invalid.' 41
132. AAZA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21298, at *11.
133. See id. at *10-11. The Court explained that defendants' contention that the Government of Peru was
implicated in the activities and shares liability for the acts is a defense and cannot serve as a basis for federal
question jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. The Court thus did not follow the approach
of the Fifth Circuit in Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997), which articulates a variety
of factors to be considered to determine whether a "foreign state's vital economic interests and sovereignty
were at stake." Under this approach to determining the existence of federal question jurisdiction, a district
court would accept as decisive a foreign state's well-supported statement that the suit would affect its interest.
Torres, 113 F.3d at 543.
134. See AZZA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21298, at *11.
135. See Nocula v. UGS Corp., 520 F.3d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 2008).
136. See id.
137. See United States v. Lazarenko, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
138. See id. at 1152-53.
139. See Reyes-Vasquez v. United States Att'y Gen., NO. 3:07-CV-1460, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82967
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2007), afTd, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 26254 (3d Cir. Dec. 23, 2008).
140. Id. at *6.
141. See id. at *6-7. The Court's ruling is consistent with the position taken by the Northern District of
California in Trading & Inv. Co. v. Kiritcbenko, No. C-99-3073 MMC, 2007 WL 2669841, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 7, 2007), discussed supra note 124, which denied the doctrine's applicability because it found that the
Ukrainian government, by the decisions of its courts, had already invalidated the assignment at issue..
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V. International Discovery*
A. OBTAINING U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
In 2008, U.S. federal courts expanded on earlier jurisprudence concerning the require-
ments for obtaining discovery in the United States for use in foreign proceedings pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). 142
Several district court decisions analyzed the factors set out by the statute and by the
Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. to determine whether to exer-
cise discretion and allow discovery pursuant to section 1782(a).143 The District Court for
the Southern District of New York examined the issue of "relevance" in In re 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782.144 The court permitted discovery under section 1782(a) over one party's objec-
tion that the evidence was "irrelevant," observing the "broadly permissive standard by
which a court evaluates the relevance of discoverable material." 145 The court further ob-
served that a court whose only connection with a case is supervision of ancillary disclosure
"should be especially hesitant to pass judgment on what constitutes relevant evidence
thereunder.1 46 In another case, the District Court of the Middle District of Florida al-
lowed discovery under section 1782(a) even where the case was already on appeal in the
other jurisdiction and there was a question of whether the foreign court would look at the
evidence.147
The controversy continued over whether section 1782(a) applies to documents outside
the United States. In considering this issue, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York in In re Application of Godfrey disagreed with an earlier holding in the same
court to conclude that section 1782(a) was not applicable to evidence located outside the
United States. 148
* Contributed by Howard S. Zelbo, Partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP in New York,
New York, with assistance from Ram Murali and Ann Nee, associates at the same firm. The authors' firm
represented the respondents in In re 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 249 F.R.D. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) and In re 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782, No. M19-70, 2008 V',L 4935873 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2008), which are discussed infra note 144, and
Credit Lyonnais in Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais S.A., 249 F.R.D. 429, 473 & 447-49 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), which is
discussed infra note 161.
142. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1782(a) (West 1996) ("The district court of the district in which a person resides or is
found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.").
143. In Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004), the Supreme Court listed several
factors for a court to consider in determining whether to exercise its discretion under section 1782(a). These
factors include: whether the person for whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding;
the nature of the proceedings and the "receptivity" of the foreign court to United States federal court assis-
tance; whether the application is an attempt to circumvent foreign proof gathering restrictions or other poli-
cies of a foreign country; and whether the request is unduly burdensome or intrusive. Id. at 264-65.
144. See In re 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 249 F.R.D. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The court subsequently limited the scope
of discovery in this case on the grounds that the specific discovery sought was "unwarranted as repetitive and
inefficient." In re Application of Syeaas, No. M19-70, 2008 WL 4935873, at '1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2008).
The authors' firm represented the respondents in these actions.
145. Id. at 107.
146. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
147. See In re Application of Carsten Rehder Schiffsmakler und Reederi GmbH & Co., No. No. 6:08-mc-
108-Orl-35DAB, 2008 WL 4642378, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2008).
148. See In re Application of Godfrey, 526 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), declining to follow In re
Gemeinshcaftspraxis, No. Civ. M19-88 (BSJ), 2006 VVL 3844464, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2006).
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Other cases weighed in on the types of tribunals that should be included under Section
1782(a). U.S. courts have held in the past that private commercial arbitral bodies are not
included in the types of tribunals to which section 1782(a) applies. 149 Since the Supreme
Court's decision in Intel, however, a number of district courts have come to the opposite
conclusion.' 50 In In re Application of Babcock Borsig AG, the District Court for the District
of Massachusetts applied the reasoning and dicta of Intel to hold that private commercial
arbitral bodies are in fact included in the scope of section 1782(a): "There is no textual
basis upon which to draw a distinction between public and private arbitral tribunals, and
the Supreme court in Intel repeatedly refused to place 'categorical limitations' on the avail-
ability of § 1782(a)."' 15 Similarly, the District Court for the Northern District of New
York, in In re Application of Minatec Finance S.?rR.L., held that discovery under section
1782(a) was available for a foreign tax audit, because a tax audit is "an administrative pro-
ceeding that can be reviewed by a [national] court." 152
The availability of discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1728 may have relevance in a forum
non conveniens analysis. In In re Air Crash, the District Court for the Eastern District of
New York held that defendants' concession to discovery under section 1782(a) was a factor
militating in favor of dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens.15 3 The District
Court for the District of New Jersey reached a similar conclusion in Windt v. Qwest Com-
munications International, Inc., observing that "the holding of Intel (as does the language of
§ 1782) stands to ensure that Plaintiffs are likely to have ample access to any evidentiary
matters Plaintiffs might need if Plaintiffs are to commence this action in the
Netherlands."1 54
Finally, in 2008 U.S. courts also applied section 1782(a) to criminal proceedings. In In
re Czech Republic, the Czech Republic asked for assistance in obtaining information and
documents from a Florida-domiciled corporation concerning an ongoing criminal prose-
cution in the Czech Republic. The District Court for the Middle District of Florida ap-
plied the statute and the Intel standards in granting the application for assistance and,
further, appointed an Assistant United States Attorney as a Commissioner of the court.
The Commissioner was given the authority to obtain the evidence, to seek further orders
of the court, and to submit the evidence to the Department of Justice for transmission to
149. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that "tribunals"
under Section 1782(a) are limited to government bodies); Republic of Kaz. v. Biederman Int'l, 168 F.3d 880
(5th Cir. 1999) (same).
150. Intel held that the Commission of the European Communities was a "tribunal" for purposes of the
statute. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 257-58. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the 1964 amend-
ment to the statute, which broadened the statute's scope from any foreign "judicial proceeding" to any "pro-
ceeding in a foreign or international tribunal." Id. at 258 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. In re Application of Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (D. Mass. 2008) (internal citation
omitted). See also In re Application of Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (D. Minn. 2007)
(applying Intel and holding that a private arbitral tribunal was a "tribunal" under section 1782(a); In re Roz
Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225-26 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (same).
152. In re Minatec Fin. S.I.R.L., Civ. No. 1:08-CV-269 (LEK/RET), 2008 WL 3884374 at *5 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 18, 2008).
153. See In re Air Crash Near Peixoto de Azeveda, Braz., on Sept. 29, 2006, 574 F. Supp. 2d 272, 278, 286
(E.D.N.Y. 2008).
154. Windt v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 409, 433 (D.NJ. 2008), affd, 529 F.3d 183 (3d
Cir. 2008).
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the Czech Republic, among other powers. 155 In another case, the same court confirmed
that discovery under section 1782(a) is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
regardless of whether the discovery is for use in a foreign criminal proceeding.15 6
B. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN U.S. PROCEEDINGS
In 2008, U.S. courts continued to develop jurisprudence concerning the discretionary
factors weighed in granting requests for discovery from a foreign party for use in proceed-
ings in the United States by means other than the Hague Convention. 15 7 In one case, the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida declined to require the plaintiff to ask
for evidence via the Hague Convention "because the Convention will not facilitate the
gathering of evidence more effectively than the procedures already in place through the
Federal Rules."158 In another case, the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania ordered foreign discovery via the Federal Rules rather than via the Hague Con-
vention because "the interest of the U.S. in enforcing its antitrust laws and managing
litigation in the federal courts weighs against the use of the Hague Convention." 159
In weighing whether to proceed with discovery under the Federal Rules, rather than
under the Hague Convention or foreign law, the "balance of national interests" was
named by one court as the most important factor.160 The court must "determine whether
disclosure would affect important substantive policies or interests of either the United
States or [the foreign country]."161
155. SeeIn re Czech Rep., No. 3:08-mc-001-J-33TEM, 2008 WL 179263, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla.Jan. 17, 2008);
see also In re Czech Rep., No. 3:07-mc-47-J-32TEM, 2007 WL 4049949 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2007) (allowing
Czech Republic's request for legal assistance and appointing Commissioner).
156. See In re Weber, No. 3:07-mc-27-J-32MCR, 2007 WL 4285362, at *6-7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2007).
157. See Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522,
539 (1987) (holding that the Hague Convention is not the exclusive means for obtaining evidence located
abroad); RESTATFMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 442(1)(c) (setting out five factors: "[(1)]
the importance to the .. .litigation of the documents or other information requested; [(2)] the degree of
specificity of the request; [(3)] whether the information originated in the United States; [(4)] the availability of
alternative means of securing the information; and [(5)] the extent to which noncompliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine
the important interest of the state where the information is located"). Courts in the Second Circuit also
consider "the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought [and] the good
faith of the party resisting discovery." Minpeco v. Conticommodity Ser's., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
158. Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., No. 07-60077-CIV, 2008 WL 4487679, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
29, 2008). See also Emerson Elec. Co. v. Le Carbone Lorraine, No. 05-6042 (JBS), 2008 WI.L 4126602, at *8
(D.NJ. Aug. 27, 2008) ("[W]hile resort to the Hague Convention procedures may be equally effective, ....
that would be a lengthier process. That delay [is] unnecessary as the .. .sovereign interests and the 'facts'
that is the specific discovery sought[,l weigh against requiring Plaintiffs to go through the Hague to obtain
these documents.").
159. In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig, No. 2:06-CV-1732-LDD, 2008 WL 2275531, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 13,
2008).
160. Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. De Equip. Medico, No. 07-CV-309-L(AJB), 2008
WL 81111, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2008).
161. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 249 F.R.D. 429,
443, 447-49 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that the balance of interests weighed in favor of discovery under the
Federal Rules, instead of under the Hague Convention, in light of the United States' strong interest in com-
bating terrorism and where the court opined that France had submitted only general objections to the use of
the Federal Rules, civil or criminal penalties under bank secrecy laws in France were unlikely, and France had
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VI. Extraterritorial Application of United States Law*
A. INTRODUCTION
Courts look to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations when determining whether to
apply U.S. law extraterritorially. The Restatement provides that a State may exercise pre-
scriptive jurisdiction where the conduct in question "has or is intended to have a substan-
tial effect within its territory."162 Courts must consider the following factors in
determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is reasonable: (1) the extent of the do-
mestic effect of the conduct; (2) the connections between the United States and the per-
sons engaging in the conduct in question; (3) the character of the conduct and the extent
to which it is regulated elsewhere; (4) whether justified expectations exist and are pro-
tected; (5) the importance of the regulation internationally; (6) consistency with interna-
tional custom; (7) the interests of other States in regulating the conduct; and (8) whether
the regulation would create a conflict with the laws of a foreign jurisdiction. 6 3
In the past year, U.S. courts have applied these principles in a variety of fields, consider-
ing extraterritoriality in disputes involving constitutional claims, labor disputes, and crimi-
nal statutes.
B. FEDERAL HABEAS CLAIMS
In last year's review, we considered federal habeas corpus claims brought by the detain-
ees held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 164 In particular, we reviewed the D.C. Circuit's deci-
sion in Boumediene v. Bush,165 which the Supreme Court then examined in 2008.166 The
Supreme Court overturned the D.C. Circuit, finding that the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 (MCA) violated the Suspension Clause of the Constitution by stripping federal
courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by foreign citizens detained at Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba. Specifically, the Court stated that the process provided by the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 did not serve as an adequate substitute for habeas corpus because
detainees were not given an opportunity to present relevant exculpatory evidence not
made part of the record in earlier proceedings. 167 The Court rejected the government's
argument that the constitutional protections had no effect in Guantanamo, where the
United States maintains only plenary control rather than formal sovereignty, and stated
that the "Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of,
and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply."'1 68 More-
over, the Court emphasized that "[e]ven when the United States acts outside its border, its
powers are not 'absolute and unlimited' but are subject 'to such restrictions as are ex-
previously signed international agreements evidencing its similar interest in combating terrorism). The au-
thors' firm represented Credit Lyonnais in this action.
* Contributed by Karen E. Woody, attorney at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP.
162. RESTATrEMENTr (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(l)(c) (1987).
163. Id. § 403(2).
164. See Jonathan I. Blackman et al., International Litigation, 42 INT'L LAW. 415, 440 (2008).
165. Boumnediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007); vacated, 127 S.
Ct. 3078 (2007).
166. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
167. See id. at 2271-74.
168. Id. at 2259.
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pressed in the Constitution. "1169 The Boumediene decision marked the turning point in
the numerous cases involving detainees at Guantanamo Bay, with the Supreme Court
overturning last year's precedent and holding that the federal courts have jurisdiction to
hear the detainees' habeas corpus claims. Although the Court granted the detainees' ac-
cess to federal courts, it did not fashion a clear procedural remedy for the detainees, and
we anticipate that significant litigation in 2009 will involve the implementation of the
Boumediene decision.
C. CRIMINAL STATUTES
In United States v. ilches-Navarrette, the First Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to a non-resident of the United States while in international waters, despite
his extraterritorial arrest under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA).170
Vilches-Navarrette was apprehended by the United States Coast Guard in international
waters west of Grenada for possession with intent to distribute five kilograms of co-
caine. 171 Although Vilches-Navarrette did not raise the claim in the district court, he
challenged the constitutionality of the jurisdictional element of the MDLEA on appeal.
The majority rejected the challenge for lack of plain error, noting that under the
MDLEA, jurisdiction is not an element of the crime.172 In a concurring opinion, Circuit
Judges Lynch and Howard further endorsed the constitutionality of the MDLEA's juris-
diction by stating that the statute does not require a jurisdictional statement because its
application is "consistent with the protective principle of international law" and within
Congressional regulatory power for purposes of national security. 173
In United States v. Reumayr, the District Court of New Mexico held that Congress in-
tended the statutes prohibiting the attempt to destroy property by means of an explosive,
and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, as well as prohibiting the
attempt to destroy an energy facility, to apply extraterritorially. 174 Reumayr was charged
with attempting to destroy the Trans-Alaska Pipeline and an adjacent energy facility by
means of an explosive. Reumayr argued that the criminal statutes under which he was
charged should not apply extraterritorially if the attempted crime would have affected
private rather than government property.175 The Court disagreed, finding that Congress
has a security interest in private property and showing the Congressional intent of extra-
territorial application of each statute under which Reumayr was charged. Reumayr also
argued that his Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated by extraterritorial ap-
plication of Congressional statutes. 176 The Court held that because Reumayr's purpose in
his attempted attack was to "violently disrupt the United States petroleum and financial
markets," his prosecution was consistent with due process because of a sufficient nexus
169. Id. (citing Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)),
170. See United States v. Vlches-Navarrette, 523 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008).
171. See id. at 4-5.
172. See id. at 9-10.
173. See id. at 22.
174. See United States v. Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (N.M. 2008).
175. See id. at 1215.
176. See id. at 1222.
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between the defendant and the United States.177 For this reason, the Court determined
that the extraterritorial application of the statutes was appropriate. 178
Similarly, in State v. Flores, the Court of Appeals of Arizona applied Arizona's human
smuggling statute extraterritorially and held Flores, a Mexican citizen, guilty of soliciting
another person to smuggle him illegally into the United States. 179 The Court focused on
"Flores' illegal presence and transportation within Arizona as the intended result of his
crime of solicitation to commit human smuggling[J" and found that the result of the
crime would have a substantial effect in Arizona.180 For this reason, the Court determined
that the human smuggling statute could be applied extraterritorially.1s l
D. LABOR DISPUTES
In Veiga v. World Meteorological Organization, "Veiga, a citizen of Portugal and Italy,"
filed a wrongful termination suit against "the .worid lVlet olu0glcal Organization
(WMO), an international organization based in Switzerland." i8 2 The WMO claimed im-
munity under the International Organizations Immunity Act (IOIA). Veiga challenged
the constitutionality of the IOLA, claiming that W MO's immunity from process would
deprive her of all rights of action and remedies. 18 3 The Court held that because Veiga
failed to show any relevant conduct or material effect from the underlying claim that
occurred in the United States, the Constitution did not afford her rights and protections
as a non-resident alien located abroad.' 84 Moreover, the Court held that Veiga did not
have standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and could not
demand access to U.S. courts.' 85
VII. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments*
A. INTRODUCTION
The 1958 U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (the New York Convention or Convention) governs the recognition and enforce-
ment of most foreign arbitral awards in U.S. courts.186 The New York Convention applies
to awards "made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and
177. Id. at 1223.
178. See id.
179. See State v. Flores, 188 P.3d 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
180. See id. at 715.
181. See id.
182. See Veiga v. World Meteorological Org., 568 F. Supp. 2d 367, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
183. See id. at 370-71.
184. See id. at 372.
185. See id. at 375-76.
* Contributed by Cameron Holland, Attorney-Adviser, Officer of the Legal Adviser, United States
Department of State. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
Department of State or the United States Government.
186. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention or Convention] (entered into force in the
United States on Dec. 29, 1970, subject to declarations). The New York Convention is enforced in U.S.
courts in accordance with Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2008).
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enforcement of such awards are sought" and to awards not considered to be domestic in
the enforcing State.' 87
State law, on the other hand, governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign
money judgments. Most states have enacted legislation adopting the exact or similar text
of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (the Uniform Act). Where
such legislation is not in force, courts generally apply the principles articulated in the early
Supreme Court decision, Hilton v. Guyot.' 88
B. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
1.. Non-Statutory Grounds For Vacatur and Modification of Arbitral Awards
On March 25, 2008, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel,i89 a case arising out of a motion for vacatur of a domestic
arbitration award that will have an important impact on the vacatur and modification of
international arbitration awards. In Hall Street, the Court addressed whether private par-
ties can contract around the statutory grounds for vacatur and modification of arbitration
awards articulated in section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in U.S. courts.
Under the New York Convention, national courts may refuse to recognize an arbitral
award that has been vacated "by a competent authority of the country in which ... that
award was made."190 Courts are divided as to whether awards governed by the New York
Convention with venue in the United States are subject to an action to vacate under sec-
tion 10 of the FAA, including on grounds for vacatur not available under the Convention
itself. To the extent that a court applies section 10 to a motion to vacate a "non-domestic"
Convention award in U.S. courts, the Hall Street decision opens the argument that the
motion cannot rest on grounds for vacatur determined by contract between the parties
that are outside the grounds articulated in the FAA. The ability of a party seeking to avoid
enforcement of a non-domestic award in U.S. courts on contractual vacatur grounds thus
becomes much more difficult.
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. (Hall Street) filed suit in federal district court after Mat-
tel, Inc. (Mattel) gave notice of intent to terminate a lease between the two parties. Fol-
lowing a bench trial, Mattel won on the termination issue, and the two parties drew up an
agreement to submit a remaining indemnification issue to arbitration. The agreement
allowed a U.S. district court to "vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbi-
trator's findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitra-
tor's conclusions of law are erroneous." 191 After Mattel won in arbitration, Hall Street
filed suit in the District Court for the District of Oregon to vacate the award on grounds
of legal error, the standard of review chosen by the parties in the arbitration agreement.
The court vacated and remanded based on legal error, and the arbitrator accordingly
amended its decision to favor Hall Street. Both parties appealed the decision, and again
the district court reviewed and corrected the arbitration award based on legal error. Mat-
187. Id. at art. I(1).
188. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
189. Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
190. New York Convention, Article V(1)(e).
191. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1400-01.
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tel then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the arbitration agreement's provision
for judicial review of legal error was unenforceable. The Ninth Circuit agreed, and Hall
Street petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the grounds for vacatur and
modification provided by Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA are exclusive. Hall Street made
two arguments for non-exclusivity: (1) that the Court has accepted expanded non-statu-
tory grounds for vacatur since Wilko v. Swan 92 and (2) that the nature of arbitration and
the policy behind the FAA support the capacity of private parties to expand judicial review
of arbitration agreements. The Court held that Wilko neither grants private parties the
authority to expand review by contract-which was not at issue in that case-nor does it
clearly grant judicial expansion of review beyond the grounds set forth in section 10 of the
FAA, as some Circuits, including the First, Second, Fifth, and Eleventh, have held it to
do.193 On the issue of contractual freedom, the Court reasoned first that general policy
supporting the enforcement of arbitration agreements is insufficient where "textual ele-
ments" in the FAA support the argument for exclusively statutory grounds for judicial
review of awards. Further, the Court noted that "[a]ny other reading opens the door to
the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render informal arbitration merely a
prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process and bring
arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process." 194 The Court thus held that
"§§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for review provided by the [FAA]" but also left
open the implication of the decision for vacatur and modification of non-domestic arbitral
awards governed by the New York Convention in U.S. courts. 195
2. Stay of Enforcement Pending Completion of Otber Arbitral Claims
In Wartsila Finland OY v. Duke Capital L.L. C., the Fifth Circuit rejected a request for a
stay of enforcement of an arbitral award until newly filed arbitration claims involving the
same parties were resolved.196 In 2005, an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
arbitration tribunal awarded Wartsila Finland OY and Wartsila Guatemala, SA, (collec-
tively Wartsila) £11.3 million against Duke Energy International (DEI) arising from
breach of a construction contract. Prior to the issuance of the £11.3 million award, the
ICC tribunal permitted DEI to withdraw certain claims and reserve them for presentation
at a later arbitration proceeding. Upon the issuance of the award, DEI refused payment to
192. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
193. See Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1403-04.
194. Id. at 1405 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
195. Id. at 1407. The New York Convention applies only to awards "made in the territory of a State other
than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought" and to awards not consid-
ered to be domestic in the enforcing State. New York Convention Art. I(1). Section 202 of the FAA states
that an agreement or award ... which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to
fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or
enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relationship with one or more foreign states." 9 U.S.C.
§ 202.
For further reading on the significance of the Hall Street decision for international commercial arbitrations
venued in the United States, see Charles H. Brower, Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc.: Supreme Court Denies
Enforcement of Agreement to Epand the Grounds for Vacatur Under the Federal Arbitration Act, ASIL INSIGHTS,
VOL. 12, ISSUE 11 (2008), available at http://www.asil.org/insights080527.cfm.
196. See Wartsila Finland OY v. Duke Capital L.L.C., 518 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2008).
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Wartsila, arguing that it could set off amounts that would later be sought in the withdrawn
claims. Shortly after DEI filed a request for arbitration of the withdrawn claims with the
ICC, Wartsila filed a motion in federal court to confirm and enforce the award under the
New York Convention. DEI filed for a stay of enforcement pending resolution of the
newly filed arbitration claims. The district court denied DEI the stay, and DEI appealed.
On appeal before the Fifth Circuit, DEI advanced two arguments in support of a stay:
(1) that a proper interpretation of the award required the court issue a stay and (2) that the
court should exercise discretion to stay enforcement of the award. The Fifth Circuit first
noted that a district court "should enforce an arbitration award as written-to do anything
more or less would usurp the tribunal's power to finally resolve disputes and undermine
the pro-enforcement policies of the New York Convention." 197 Because the final award
plainly stated "Duke must pay Wartsila" and because none of DEI's contextual arguments
were compelling, the Court found the refusal to grant a stay in conformity with the
award.198
With regard to DEI's request for a discretionary stay, the Court of Appeals reviewed
the district court's decision using an abuse of discretion standard. The Court found that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the stay of enforcement
on the grounds set forth in Hewlett-Packard Co. Inc. v. Berg,199 where the First Circuit
awarded a stay because the defendant had become insolvent, leaving the plaintiff with no
ability to enforce any award rendered in a pending arbitration. The Court noted that,
unlike the plaintiff in Berg, DEI had "presented no evidence of Wartsila's insolvency or
that DEI will have trouble recovering on its claims." 200 Without deciding whether the
Fifth Circuit recognized the inherent authority of the district court to issue a stay, the
Court found that at a minimum such a stay would only be available in very limited circum-
stances, and there was no abuse of discretion by the district court in this case. 201
C. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
1. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings
In In re Board of Directors of Telecom Argentina, S.A., the Second Circuit addressed the
question of whether the debt restructuring of an Argentine company approved by a major-
ity of its creditors and by an Argentine court could be implemented in a U.S. court under
former Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code2 02 with respect to a U.S. creditor who
197. Id. at 292.
198. Id. at 294.
199. Hewlett-Packard Co. Inc. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101, 105 (1st Cit. 1995).
200. Wartsila Finland 0Y, 518 F.3d at 295.
201. See id.
202. Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code governed the recognition of ancillary bankruptcy proceedings by
U.S. bankruptcy courts until it was repealed and replaced in 2005 by a new Chapter 15 incorporating the
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency that was drafted by the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNICTRAL). The court applied section 304 to this dispute because Telecom Argentina,
S.A. filed its petition in bankruptcy court shortly prior to the effective date of the repeal. This decision
remains relevant to the recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings in two ways. First, section 1506 of the
new Chapter 15 creates an exception permitting courts to refuse to take an action governed by the chapter "if
the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States." 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2009).
Thus, the comity language of Telecom remains relevant to the interpretation of that provision of the current
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had not participated in the restructuring. 20 3 As a result of the 2001 Argentina economic
crisis, Telecom Argentina, S.A., (Telecom) received court approval for a privately negoti-
ated, majority-approved restructuring plan that would be binding on all creditors of its
outstanding debt. The Argo Fund Ltd. (Argo), a creditor of Telecom, did not participate
in voting for the plan and instructed its U.S. bank not to cancel or transfer any of Argo's
notes in accordance with Telecom's restructuring. Telecom responded by filing a petition
in U.S. bankruptcy court seeking a judgment declaring the Argentine approval order and
restructuring recognizable in U.S. courts, binding on all U.S. creditors, and resulting in
cancellation of the debt to Argo. The bankruptcy court concluded that the restructuring
proceeding qualified as a "foreign proceeding" and that the restructuring plan was worthy
of recognition under section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code. The district court affirmed on
appeal and Argo appealed to the Second Circuit.
In evaluating a petition under section 304, courts "shall be guided by what will best
assure an economical and expeditious administration of [the debtor's] estate," consistent
with a case-by-case balancing of six statutory factors relating to the foreign bankruptcy
proceeding, including just treatment of all claimholders and principles of international
comity. 20 4 Argo contended first that the debt restructuring process "does not provide for
just treatment of creditors because it allows for 'only limited objections and limited re-
course against a majority-approved [plan]"' and second that the restructuring proceeding
did not comport with public policy of the United States and was not entitled to considera-
tions of comity.20 5 With regard to Argo's first contention, the Second Circuit noted that
the just treatment factor is satisfied upon a showing that the applicable law "provides for a
comprehensive procedure for the orderly and equitable distribution of [the debtor]'s assets
among all of its creditors." 206 Because Argo had notice of the restructuring proceedings
throughout the process and had opportunities to object to, and to vote on, the terms of
the proposed plan, and because an Argentine court had ruled that the plan was not "abu-
sive, fraudulent or discriminatory," the Court held that the bankruptcy court had not
abused discretion in finding the plan provided just treatment of creditors. 2°7
With regard to Argo's second contention, the Court noted that "[clomity is generally
appropriate where the foreign 'proceedings do not violate the laws or public policy of the
United States and if the foreign court abides by fundamental standards of procedural fair-
ness." 208 In analyzing Argo's arguments that the restructuring proceeding was inconsis-
tent with provisions of the U.S. bankruptcy code, the Court emphasized that "[s]ection
304 was adopted to recognize and enforce foreign proceedings where appropriate, not to
require adoption of U.S. law." 209 The Court refused to endorse an interpretation of the
bankruptcy code that would "exalt bondholders' individual rights over recognition of for-
Bankruptcy Code. Second, petitions for recognition of foreign bankruptcy petitions that were filed prior to
the repeal date of section 304 remain in U.S. courts and may be effected by the Telecom decision.
203. See In re Bd. of Dirs. of Telecom Argentina, S.A., 528 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008).
204. Section 304 only applies to petitions filed in Bankruptcy Court prior to its October 17, 2005, effective
date of repeal. Chapter 15 does not require that courts evaluate the six factors listed in § 304(c). See In re Bd.
of Dirs. of Telecom Argentina, S.A., 528 F.3d 162, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2008).
205. Id. at 170.
206. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
207. Id. at 171.
208. Id. at 171-72 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
209. Id. at 172, n.12 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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eign insolvency proceedings," that would require U.S. creditors to receive the same in
foreign bankruptcy proceedings as they would in U.S. proceedings, or that would find bad
faith where a foreign company restructured prior to actual insolvency. 210 The court also
reiterated that "foreign courts have an interest in conducting insolvency proceedings con-
cerning their own domestic business entities" and that foreign creditors may be required
to submit to foreign bankruptcy proceedings to resolve their claims.211 The court thus
concluded that Argo's refusal to participate in the Argentine proceedings did not grant an
entitlement to protection from the restructuring plan under principles of comity.2 12
2. Applicability of Last-in-Time Rule to Conflicting Foreign Court Judgments
In Byblos Bank Europe, S.A., v. Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi, the New York Court of
Appeals addressed the question of how to rule on a motion to enforce a foreign court
judgment when two conflicting foreign judgments existed regarding the same dispute.2 13
After Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi (Sekerbank) defaulted on two $2.5 million loans
made by Byblos Bank Europe, S.A., (Byblos), Byblos began separate proceedings in
Belgium, Turkey, and Germany for breach of contract. The Turkish courts ruled in favor
of Sekerbank, dismissing Byblos' claims. Sekerbank sought recognition of the Turkish
judgment in the Belgian and German courts where litigation was pending. Whereas the
German court recognized the judgment, the Belgian court ruled in favor of Byblos on the
merits.
Byblos sought enforcement of the Belgian judgment in New York Supreme Court, ar-
guing that the Belgian judgment was entitled to recognition under the "last-in-time" rule
pursuant to Rule 53 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), under which
the last judgment among conflicting sister state judgments generally prevails. Sekerbank
cross-moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that (1) the court should exercise its power
under CPLR 5304 to deny recognition of the Belgian judgment due to the conflicting
Turkish judgment, and (2) the last in time rule did not apply to foreign court judgments.
The court agreed with Sekerbank as did the Appellate Division, which concluded that the
"last-in-time rule lacks any justification where, as here, the foreign country that rendered
the last judgment [did] not give any party against whom enforcement is sought any kind of
opportunity to argue the binding effect of the earlier judgment." 214 The Appellate Divi-
sion further noted that the Belgian judgment was based on a law permitting review of the
merits that was directly in contravention of principles of comity and that had been since
repealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court noted that under CPLR 5304(b)(5), courts
may exercise discretion to refuse to enforce a foreign court judgment that is in conflict
with "another final and conclusive judgment," although the New York statute does not
specify which judgment takes precedence.215 Instead, the Court held that the last-in-time
rule applicable to sister state judgments need not apply automatically to foreign court
210. Id. at 172-74.
211. Id. at 175.
212. See id. at 174.
213. See Byblos Bank Eur., S.A., v. Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi, 885 N.E.2d 191, 192 (N.Y. 2008).
214. Byblos Bank Eur., S.A., v. Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi, 837 N.Y.S.2d. 54, 56 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007).
215. Byblos Bank Europe, 885 N.E.2d at 193-94.
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judgments, and "[sipecifically, the last-in-time rule should not be applied where, as here,
the last-in-time court departed from normal res judicata principles by permitting a party
to relitigate the merits of an earlier judgment." 216
Vlfl. Forum Non Conveniens*
A. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of forum non conveniens "authorizes a court with venue to decline to
exercise its jurisdiction when the parties' and the court's own convenience, as well as the
relevant public and private interests, indicate that the action should be tried elsewhere."217
Under the federal law standard, "[a] defendant seeking dismissal for forum non con-
veniens bears the burden of demonstrating (i) that an adequate alternative forum is availa-
ble, (ii) that relevan. public and privatc intercsts weigh in favor of dismissal, and (iii) that
the plaintiff can reinstate his suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or
prejudice."21
Only when a district court has taken into account and weighed all of the relevant factors
may it grant a forum non conveniens dismissal.219 A district court need not conclusively
establish its own jurisdiction before dismissing a suit for forum non conveniens. 220
B. FINDINGS OF "OPPRESSIv7ENESS AND VEXATION" IN FORUM NON CONVENIENS
DETERMINATIONS
Recent federal circuit court decisions indicate a continuing split on whether a district
court considering a motion for forum non conveniens dismissal must affirmatively find
that the plaintiff's choice of forum results in "oppressiveness and vexation" to the defen-
dant as articulated by the Supreme Court in Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casu-
216. Id. at 194.
* Contributed by Phillip B. Dye, Jr., partner, and Justin R. Marlles, associate, at Vinson & Elkins LLP in
Houston, Texas.
217. Liquidation Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1356 (1lth Cir. 2008).
218. Id. The Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, held that the private interest
factors include:
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining the attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
A recent restatement of the public interest factors under Gilbert, has noted that they involve the considera-
tion of:
the administrative difficulties stemming from court congestion; the local interest in having local-
ized disputes decided at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is
at home with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in
conflicts of laws or in the application of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an
unrelated forum with jury duty.
Clerides v. Boeing Co., 534 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09).
219. See, e.g., Windt v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 189-190 (3d Cir. 2008).
220. See Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
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alty Co..221 The Sixth Circuit held twice in 2008 that a district court need not make a
specific finding on the question of "oppressiveness and vexation" for the defendant in
granting or denying forum non conveniens dismissal. 222 First, in Estate of Thomson the
Sixth Circuit opined that "we have stated that a district court need not make a 'finding'
that trial in the United States forum would be 'oppressive' or 'vexatious' to the defend-
ants. '223 One month later, in Barak v. Zeff, the Sixth Circuit again held that "'oppressive-
ness and vexation'. . are no longer absolute prerequisites for dismissal on the ground of
forum non conveniens." 224 There, although the plaintiff had brought suit in his home
forum of Michigan, the District Court nevertheless dismissed in favor of a foreign forum.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, noting that while the District Court was
obliged to afford a high degree of deference to the plaintiff's choice of his home forum, it
was not necessary for the defendant in moving to dismiss on forum non conveniens
ground to show that the plaintiff had "intended to oppress or vex" by suing there.225
On the other hand, the Third Circuit in Windt v. Qwest Communications International,
Inc. held that a specific showing by the defendant of "oppressiveness or vexation" was
necessary for forum non conveniens dismissal. 226 The Windt case involved claims by
bankruptcy trustees for KPNQuest N.V. against Qwest Communications International
for allegedly deceiving KPNQwest's Supervisory Board about the financial solvency of
KPNQuest 227 The trustees filed suit in the District of New Jersey, which granted the
defendant's motion for forum non conveniens dismissal. 228 In doing so, the district court
determined that "under the holding of Piper [Aircraft Co. v. Reyno], the defendant has to
make an 'oppressive or vexatious' showing only in case if the plaintiff is suing in plaintiffs
home forum."229 The Third Circuit upheld the grant of forum non conveniens dismissal
by the district court while addressing the district court's misunderstanding of the Third
Circuit's "oppressiveness and vexation" standard, stating:
Piper Aircraft Co. does not excuse a defendant from showing that litigating in the
chosen forum would be oppressive or vexatious when the plaintiff is not suing in the
221. While there is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum in conducting
an analysis of the private interest factors (see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981)), accord-
ing to the Supreme Court in Koster~
[The plaintiff] should not be deprived of the presumed advantages of his home jurisdiction except
upon a clear showing of facts which either (1) establish such oppressiveness and vexation to a
defendant as to be out of all proportion to plaintiffs convenience, which may be shown to be
slight or nonexistent, or (2) make trial in the chosen forum inappropriate because of considera-
tions affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems.
Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524, (1947). See also Sinochem Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct.
at 1190.
222. Barak v. Zeff, 289 Fed. Appx. 907, 911 (6th Cir. 2008); Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp.
World-Wide, 454 F.3d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 2008)
223. Estate of Thomson, 545 F.3d at 365.
224. Barak, 289 Fed. Appx. at 912.
225. Id. (citing Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 875 (6th Cir. 2006)).
226. Windt, 529 F.3d at 195-96.
227. Id. at 187.
228. See Windt, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 434.
229. Id. at 428 (emphasis in original).
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plaintiff's home forum. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S at 241[230]. A defendant must
show that litigation in the chosen forum is oppressive or vexatious regardless of
whether the plaintiff brings suit in his home forum.231
Overall, the decisions of the Sixth Circuit in Barack and the Third Circuit in Windt
indicate an important and ongoing divide between the courts on the role of the concept of
"oppressiveness and vexation" in the forum non conveniens analysis.
C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS DisvssAL TO IRAQ
One of the key prongs of the forum non conveniens inquiry is the identification of an
adequate alternative forum.2 32 Courts have determined in several instances that the pro-
posed alternative forum is not sufficient because litigation there would present a security
risk to the parties. 2 The issue of the safety of the litigating parties in the proposed
alternative forum took an interesting twist in the case of Galustian v. Peter.2 34 The plain-
tiff in this case, Galustian, filed suit in the Eastern District of Virginia against the director
of the Private Security Company Association of Iraq (PSCAI), Peter. 235 Galustian's com-
plaint alleged defamation by Peter based on an e-mail supposedly sent by the defendant to
various members of the PSCAI circulating an arrest warrant for the plaintiff of questiona-
ble origin (plaintiff claimed the warrant was forged by a company with whom plaintiff was
entangled in a separate business dispute).236
Peter requested forum non conveniens dismissal of the case for litigation in Iraq. 237 In
response to Peter's arguments, Galustian submitted an affidavit from the managing direc-
tor of a security contractor in Baghdad stating that Iraq was not an "adequate alternative
legal forum" for the dispute due to continuing instability in that country.238 The Eastern
District of Virginia refused to entertain the plaintiffs security arguments as part of its
consideration of the "adequate alternative forum" prong, instead holding that "the facts
offered by [plaintiff's expert] with respect to the current conditions in Iraq, as well as the
challenges Westerners face there, are germane to the court's analysis of the private interest
factors presented in this dispute." 2 39 Upon turning to the private interest factors, the
230. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241 (quoting Koster, 330 U.S. at 524).
231. Windt, 529 F.3d at 195-96.
232. See, e.g., Liquidation Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental, 530 F.3d at 1356.
233. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 29 (D.D.C. 2005) (refusing defendant's re-
quest of dismissal for litigation in Indonesia due to the "genuine risk of reprisals if [plaintiffs] publicly identify
themselves by attempting to litigate in Indonesia."); Rasoulzadeh v. Assoc. Press, 574 F. Supp. 854, 861
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (refusing defendant's forum non conveniens request when litigation of plaintiffs' claims in
Iran presented a significant risk to plaintiff's safety), affid without op. 767 F.2d 908 (2nd Cir. 1985). But see
Paolicelli v. Ford Motor Co., 289 Fed. Appx. 387, 390 (1lth Cir. 2008) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that
Columbia was inadequate alternative forum due to "political instability" that posed "safety risks for the par-
ties" absent evidence the political unrest has affected the Columbian judicial system or would affect litigation
of the case.).
234. See Galustian v. Peter, 561 F. Supp. 2d 559 (E.D. Va. 2008), order clarified at 570 F. Supp. 2d 836 (E.D.
Va. 2008).
235. See id. at 561.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 562-63.
238. Id. at 563 n.5.
239. Id.
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court explained it was "cognizant of the ongoing instability and dangers present in
Iraq." 240 The court considered this a unique set of circumstances, however, because the
matter "arises from a dispute involving various individuals who were already living and
working in Iraq as part of the rebuilding effort at the time the complained-of conduct
occurred." 241 In granting a conditional forum non conveniens dismissal, the district court
explained that "litigation of the matter in Iraq is actually the more prudent method of
resolving this dispute" as litigation in the United States "would necessitate travel to Iraq
by United States-based attorneys involved in this dispute[,]" and "[u]nlike the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the various witnesses involved in this lawsuit, these individuals did not
elect to relocate to Iraq[.]" 242 The Eastern District of Virginia's decision marks an impor-
tant precedent with respect to future litigation tied to Iraq.
D. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STANDARDS FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE AND FORUM
NON CONVENIENS DIsMISsAL
The federal venue transfer provision 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which allows a district court
to transfer a civil action brought in one district to any other district or division where it
might have been brought "[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses," borrows a great
deal from the test for forum non conveniens dismissal. Yet, "[a]lthough most federal
courts properly distinguish between a forum non conveniens dismissal and a Section
1404(a) transfer, some recent district court opinions reveal an unfortunate erroneous con-
flation of the common law dismissal doctrine and the federal transfer statute. ' 24 3 This
year, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted the parallels and fleshed out some key
differences between the forum non conveniens doctrine and the venue transfer statute in
the case of In re Volkswagen of America, Inc. 244
Plaintiffs in In re Volkswagen, the survivors of an automobile accident in Dallas, Texas,
filed suit against Volkswagen in the Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas
alleging that design defects in the Volkswagen Golf automobile caused injuries to one of
the passengers in the accident and lead to the death of another.245 Defendant Volkswagen
filed a motion to transfer venue to the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas
under § 1404(a), which was subsequently denied by the Eastern District court.2 46 Volk-
swagen then filed a motion for reconsideration, "arguing that the district court gave inor-
dinate weight to the plaintiffs' choice of forum and that the district court failed properly
to weight the venue transfer factors."247
240. Id. at 564 n.6.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. WRIGHT & MILLER, 14D FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (Thomson West 2007) (cit-
ing, e.g., Uszynski v. Butterfield, No. 06-CV-13216,2006 WL 2865220 (Oct. 5, 2006 E.D. Mich.); Karykous
v. Sbarro, Inc., No. 06-2452 (AET), 2006 WL 2690287 (Sept. 19, 2006 D.NJ.) ).
244. See In re Volkswagen of America, 506 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2007), granting petition for rehearing, 517
F.3d 785, rehearing opinion at 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
245. See In re Volkswagen, 506 F.3d at 378.
246. See id. at 379.
247. Id.
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After the district court denied Volkswagen's motion for reconsideration, Volkswagen
requested a writ of mandamus from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.248 In its petition,
Volkswagen claimed that the district court had "abused its discretion by applying the
wrong legal standard when, giving plaintiffs' choice of forum an elevated status, it stated
that the moving party must show that the balance of convenience and justice substantially
weights in favor of transfer." 249 Volkswagen claimed that the district court's decision re-
flected the "much stricter forum non conveniens dismissal standard" rather than the more
permissive standard that applies to transfers of venue under § 1404(a).2 50 The Fifth Cir-
cuit panel agreed with Volkswagen, holding that "the district court erred in requiring
Volkswagen to show that the balance of convenience and justice substantially weighs in
favor of transfer[,]" and that for a transfer of venue under section 1404(a), a party need
only "show good cause."125' The Court rejected its earlier decision of Marbuoy-Pattillo
Construction Co. v. Bayside Warehouse Co., in which the Fifth Circuit relied on Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert for the proposition that venue transfer would not be granted unless the factors
justifying a § 1404(a) change of venue (which themselves closely resemble the forum non
conveniens criteria 252) were "strongly in favor of the defendant." 253 Although the Fifth
Circuit panel determined that the district court had "erroneously applied the stricter fo-
rum non conveniens dismissal standard," it did not explain whether this error by itself
warranted mandamus relief, instead holding that mandamus was proper because the dis-
trict court had improperly applied the public and private interest criteria from Gilbert in
rejecting Volkswagen's requested venue transfer. 254
In spite of the initial grant of mandamus by the Fifth Circuit panel, plaintiffs requested
an en banc rehearing of the case by the full Fifth Circuit.255 The Fifth Circuit granted the
plaintiffs' en banc request and re-examined the arguments of the plaintiffs and Volkswagen
on the venue transfer issue. 256 The court's final en banc opinion on the question of which
standard should be applied in evaluating a request to transfer venue mirrored its earlier
decision in the case, with the court holding that "a plaintiff's choice of forum under the
forum non conveniens doctrine is weightier than a plaintiffs choice of venue under § 1404 (a)
because the former involves the outright dismissal of a case, and the latter involves only a
transfer of venue within the same federal forum. '257 Yet, the Fifth Circuit in its new
opinion carefully noted, "[t]hat § 1404(a) venue transfers may be granted 'upon a lesser
showing of inconvenience' than forum non conveniens dismissal, however, [this] does not
imply 'that the relevant factors [from the forum non conveniens context] have changed or
248. See id. at 379.
249. Id. at 380 (emphasis in original).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 384.
252. The Fifth Circuit in its later en banc opinion explained that "we have adopted the private and public
interest factors first enunciated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, [... ] a forum non conveniens case, as appropriate for
the determination of whether a § 140 4(a) venue transfer is for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in
the interest of justice." In re Volkswagon, 545 F.3d 304 at 315. But "[allthough the Gilbert factors are appropri-
ate for most transfer cases, they are not necessarily exhaustive or exclusive." Id.
253. See In re Volkswagen, 506 F.3d at 383 (citing Marbury-Pattillo Constr. Co v. Bayside Warehouse Co..,
490 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1974)).
254. Id. at 384, 387.
255. See In re Volkswagen, 517 F.3d at 785.
256. See id.; see also In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 304.
257. Id. at 308.
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that the plaintiffs choice of [venue] is not to be considered. ' ' 258 But "[it] does imply that
the burden that a moving party must meet to justify a venue transfer is less demanding




This Section addresses efforts by U.S. courts to deal with parallel civil proceedings in
foreign courts (1) by issuing an anti-suit injunction enjoining a litigant from commencing
or continuing litigation in a foreign forum; or by (2) staying or dismissing the U.S. action
in deference to a pending foreign action.
B. ANTI-sUrr INJUNCTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
There were no major changes in 2008 to the jurisprudence of anti-suit injunctions. A
number of cases, following either the strict or the liberal approaches of their respective
circuits or states, evaluated the appropriateness of anti-suit injunctions in specific contexts.
In Software AG, Inc. v. Consist Software Solutions, Inc., the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York followed the factors for deciding whether to enjoin a foreign
proceeding announced by the Second Circuit in China Trade and Development Corp. v.
M. V. Choong Yong,2 60 and developed by its progeny. 261 Plaintiffs, an enterprise integration
vendor and its parent corporation, brought claims against defendants, a Brazilian distribu-
tor and its president, for breach of contract, false advertising in violation of the Lanham
Act, 262 and tortious interference with business relations. After the Southern District had
held hearings, but before it issued its decision, wholly owned and controlled affiliates of
defendants sought and obtained ex parte orders in Brazil requiring plaintiffs to comply
with the parties' distributorship agreement and preventing plaintiffs from using trade-
marks associated with plaintiffs' products.
After finding that other standards for a preliminary injunction, including substantial
likelihood of success on the merits, were met, the court analyzed the appropriateness of
enjoining the Brazilian proceeding. First, the court found that the two threshold factors
set out in China Trade were satisfied in that the parties to the two proceedings were the
same and resolution of the New York action would be dispositive of the Brazilian ac-
tion.2 63 Notably, the court only required that the parties be "substantially the same" and
was satisfied that the complainants in the Brazilian action were the wholly owned and
controlled affiliates of defendants.264 The court also concluded that the discretionary fac-
258. Id. at 314 (quoting Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955)).
259. Id.
* Contributed by Fahad A. Habib, associate at Jones Day, Washington, D.C. The views herein are of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of Jones Day.
260. China Trade and Development Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
261. See Software AG, Inc. v. Consist Software Solutions, Inc., 08 Civ. 389 (CM)(FM), 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19347 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2008).
262. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
263. See Software, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19347, at *65-69.
264. Id. at *65-67.
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tors set out in China Trade and its progeny, i.e., "whether the foreign action threatens the
enjoining court's jurisdiction and whether the foreign action would frustrate important
policies of the enjoining forum," were met.265 The court found that the Brazilian action
was "a transparent attempt to deprive this Court of jurisdiction" and that defendants had
acted in bad faith in seeking and receiving an adjournment of a post-hearing deadline
without informing the court that the Brazilian ex parte applications were pending. 266 Fur-
ther, the court found that the Brazilian action threatened important policies of the forum
because plaintiffs' claims implicated a federal statute, and the parties had agreed that New
York law would govern their agreement.267 The court also found that equitable considera-
tions; the vexatiousness, inconvenience and expense of the Brazilian proceedings; and the
risk of inconsistent rulings also counseled toward granting the injunction. 268
In Barnie's Coffee & Tea Co. v. American Mattress Co., the District Court for the Middle
District of Florida refused to issue an anti-suit injunction against a parallel action brought
in Kuwait by the Kuwaiti franchisee of plaintiff Barnie's Coffee & Tea Co., Inc., holding
that plaintiff held the burden of "clearly establishing the prerequisites for an anti-suit
injunction" and had failed to meet that burden.269 The court concluded that plaintiff had
not presented sufficient evidence to conclude that "resolution of the case before the en-
joining court is dispositive of the action to be enjoined," among other reasons, because
neither party could "give a clear explanation of the exact claims pending before the Kuwait
Court. 2 70
Following the strict approach to anti-suit injunctions, the California Court of Appeals
denied an application for an anti-suit injunction in TSMC North America v. Semiconductor
Manufacturing Int' Corp.2 7 1 In this trade secret dispute, the Court of Appeals held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion by a Taiwanese company and
others for an anti-suit injunction prohibiting Chinese companies from litigating claims of
defamation and unfair competition in the Beijing People's High Court.272 The California
suit concerned claims by each party that the other had breached a settlement agree-
ment.273 The Beijing complaint alleged that the Taiwanese company had disseminated
false and misleading information regarding the California suit to the Chinese media and
public.274
The court held that foreign proceedings should be enjoined only upon a showing of an
"exceptional circumstance" that outweighed the threat to judicial restraint and comity
principles posed by anti-suit injunctions.275 Notwithstanding numerous concerns raised
265. Idat *69.
266. Id. at *70.
267. See id. at *71.
268. See id. at *72.
269. Barnie's Coffee & Tea Co. v. Am. Mattress Co., No. 6:07-cv-1664-Orl-19UAM, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4286, '7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2008).
270. Id. at *6-7.
271. See TSMC N. Am. v. Semiconductor Mfg. Int'l Corp., 161 Cal. App. 4th 581 (Cal. App. 1st Dist.
2008).
272. The court declined to review the trial court's decision de novo, holding that "a weighing of numerous
factors based on disputed facts is a classic exercise of judicial discretion that we may overturn only based upon
a showing of abuse." Id. at 588 n.l.
273. See id. at 586.
274. See id. at 587.
275. Id. at 591.
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before the lower court, the court found that no such circumstance was present in the
case. 276 Further, the court declined to hold that anti-suit injunctions are warranted when-
ever constitutional concerns are implicated and found that, in any event, the evidence did
not indicate that the Chinese action would violate the constitutional rights of the
Taiwanese company.277 The court also held that the Beijing action did not threaten the
trial court's jurisdiction. 278 Finally, the court found that California public policies, such as
the litigation privilege, which protects against tort liability for statements made in the
course of litigation, were not implicated. 279
In Cardell Financial Corp. v. Suchodolksi Associates, the Second Circuit, by summary order,
upheld the district court's decision to issue a permanent anti-suit injunction against pro-
ceedings in Brazil.280 The court reviewed the decision under an abuse-of-discretion stan-
dard and concluded that appellant's arguments that the lower court misconstrued the
pleadings in the Brazilian action and that the injunction was premature and broad did not
provide a basis for reversal of the decision.28'
In Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Beaman, the District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois, after concluding that it did not have jurisdiction over the defendant, noted that a
request for an anti-suit injunction against a related proceeding brought by the defendant
in Canada would have failed, inter alia, because the party seeking the injunction was not
named in the Canadian suit.28 2
In Satyam Computer Services. v. Venture Global Engineering, LLC, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan held that an order requiring a party to request the with-
drawal of a "status quo" order obtained by the party from the Indian Supreme Court was
not an anti-suit injunction because the party was not being deprived of its ability to pursue
the merits of its case before the Indian court.28 3 Rather, the court held that the new order
merely removed the party's violation of a previous order by the court that had foreclosed
the request to the Indian court for a status quo order.284
Numerous decisions in 2008 enforced the parties' forum selection clauses to exclude
parallel proceedings in foreign forums.285
Finally, United States CFTC v. Lake Shore Asset Management., a cautionary tale of "overly
aggressive advocacy," addressed whether former counsel for defendant should be sanc-
tioned under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.286 Among other failures by counsel, the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted that counsel's brief discussing
276. See id. at 591-602.
277. See id. at 592-95.
278. See id. at 595-97.
279. See id. at 598-602.
280. See Cardell Fin. Corp. v. Suchodolksi Assocs., 261 Fed. Appx. 324, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2008).
281. See id. at 324.
282. See Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Beaman, No. 07 C 2407, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60250, at *11-12 (N.D.
Ill. July 21, 2008).
283. See Satyam Computer Servs., Ltd. v. Venture Global Eng'g, L.L.C., No. 07-CV-12654-DT, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3906, at *27 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 2008).
284. See id.
285. See, e.g., A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S v. Ocean Express Miami, 550 F. Supp. 2d 454, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(denying motion to dismiss complaint seeking injunction against foreign proceedings brought in forums other
than that chosen in the parties' contract of carriage).
286. U. S. CFTC v. Lake Shore Asset Mgmt., 540 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
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anti-suit injunctions "relied exclusively on cases from Circuits following the conservative
approach [when reviewing anti-suit injunctions] and did not mention the approach fol-
lowed by the Seventh Circuit or indeed, that there were two approaches." 287 The court
concluded that even "brief research" would have made counsel aware of relevant Circuit
precedent.28
C. STAYS OF U.S. PROCEEDINGS
Cases in 2008 continued to uphold judicial authority to grant stays in favor of related
proceedings abroad. 28 9 Some courts continued to hew to a conservative approach on
granting stays. For example, in Heriot v. Byrne,29° the court declined to abstain from exer-
cising jurisdiction in favor of related litigation in Australia finding that the two actions
were not oarallel as required by Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States.29 1 Addressing the need for the two cases to be parallel, the court explained that
"[t]he question is not whether the suits are formally symmetrical, but whether there is a
substantial likelihood that the foreign litigation will dispose of all claims presented in the
federal case. '292 The court found that plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing the
two cases were parallel, given that the U.S. action included claims for equitable account-
ing, U.S. copyright infringement, and unjust enrichment that were not raised in the Aus-
tralian action. 293
Also drawing attention in 2008 was the issue of whether proceedings that had been
stayed met the standards for appeal. In Groeneveld Transport Efficiency v. Eisses, the Sixth
Circuit declined to hear an appeal of an order staying proceedings in favor of related
proceedings in Canada, reasoning that the order was not a "final decision" under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.294 In reaching this conclusion, the court drew a distinction between stays
on the basis of the international abstention doctrine, i.e., whether "substantially the same
parties are litigating substantially the same issues in the two fora," and stays based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Colorado River.295 Under the Colorado River decision, a fed-
eral court may stay a federal action in favor of a concurrent state proceeding, but doing so
"meant that there would be no further litigation in the federal forum; the state court's
judgment on the issue would be res judicata." 296 In such a scenario, the court reasoned,
the stay would therefore be considered final and subject to appeal. In the case before it,
however, the court held the issues in the U.S. forum and the Canadian forum were not
identical and therefore not clearly subject to the res judicata or collateral estoppel doc-
287. See id. at 1013.
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., Zephyr Aviation ifi, L.L.C. v. Keytech Ltd., No.: 8:07-CV-227-T-27TGW, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21944 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2008) (affirming thirty-day stay).
290. Heriot v. Byrne, No. 08 C 2272, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60600, at *23 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2008).
291. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
292. Heriot v. Byrne, No. 08 C 2272, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21944, at *21 (citing AAR Int'l, Inc. v. Nime-
lias Enters. S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 2001)).
293. See id. at *22-23.
294. See Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency v. Eisses, 297 Fed. Appx. 508, 510-512 (6th Cir. 2008).
295. Id. at 510-512.
296. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983).
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trines and the court had left open the possibility that the "action [c]ould be fully restored
to the active docket."297
Similarly, the District Court for the District of Connecticut in In re Complete Retreats,
L.L.C., refused to allow an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) of a bank-
ruptcy court's decision to stay proceedings-on the basis of international comity and judi-
cial efficiency-in favor of related proceedings in Belize. 298 The bankruptcy court stayed
proceedings seeking to recover fraudulently transferred property and money damages
pending the outcome of the Belizean litigation on the basis that any ruling by the Belizean
court might be inconsistent with a ruling in the bankruptcy litigation and any award for
plaintiff in that action might negate the need to continue the bankruptcy proceedings. 299
The court concluded that the decision did not meet Section 1292(b) standards.300
297. Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, 295 Fed. Appx., at 511-512.
298. See In re Complete Retreats, LLC v. Gram, No. 3:07mc152 (SRU), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4401 (D.
Conn. Jan. 23, 2008).
299. See id. at *2-9.
300. See id. at *13.
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